

A Framework for Strategic Thinking



Building Top-Level Capabilities

Briefing to Senior Level Review Group


19 August, 2004



Assumptions

POLICY

Building on 3 years of progress (see below) in transforming from threat-based to capabilities-based planning (CBP), it is now apparent much more is needed



- ❑ A commonly-accepted CBP framework should apply across all DoD functions (acquisition, operations, training...) and timeframes (budgeting -- 1 year, programming -- 5 years, planning -- 15 years)
 - CBP should enable risk assessments and trades across DoD stovepipes
- ❑ PPBS, the last major change in DoD resource management (1960s), was based on a decade of prior analytical development
 - CBP lacks this foundation; our challenge is to start building it now



POLICY

Capabilities-Based Planning





CBP should be a top-down, competitive approach to weigh options vs. resource constraints across a spectrum of challenges

CBP should:

- Link DoD decision-making to the Defense Strategy**
 - **Apportion risk across traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive challenges**
- Inform risk tradespace -- identify joint capability gaps, redundancies and opportunities**
- Facilitate the development of affordable capability portfolios that:**
 - **Hedge against uncertainty**
 - **Increase costs to adversaries while suppressing our costs**



Decade of Strategic Evolution





POLICY

Security Environment: 4 Challenges

Irregular

- ❑ Unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. (*erode our power*)

(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”)

Catastrophic

- ❑ Acquisition, possession, and possible employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against vulnerable, high-profile targets by terrorists and rogue states. (*paralyze our power*)

(e.g., homeland missile attack, proliferation from a state to a non-state actor, devastating WMD attack on ally)

Traditional

- ❑ States employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict. (*challenge our power*)

(e.g., conventional air, sea, land forces, and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers)

Disruptive

- ❑ International competitors developing and possessing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant U.S. advantages in particular operational domains. (*marginalize our power*)

(e.g., sensors, information, bio or cyber war, ultra miniaturization, space, directed-energy, etc)

Higher
Lower
LIKELIHOOD

Capabilities-based planning should apportion risk across challenges



Attributes of a 'Capability'

POLICY

“The ability to *achieve a desired effect* under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks”

OSD / Joint Staff working definition

❑ Standards:

- **Magnitude** -- *What is the intensity and scope*
 - **Temporal** -- *What is the timing and duration*
 - **Geospatial** -- *What is the distance to and coverage*
- } *of the effect?*

❑ Conditions: *What is the operational environment?*



POLICY


Application – Traditional Challenge

Standards

- **Magnitude** (intensity, scope)
- **Temporal** (timing, duration)
- **Geospatial** (distance, coverage)

Conditions (operational environment)

Standards & conditions establish the bounds for capabilities-based planning



Capabilities scale from strategic to tactical



Top-Down Process

POLICY

Products

Defense Strategy

Strategic Challenges

*SECDEF Top 10 Priorities;
Traditional, Irregular,
Catastrophic, Disruptive
Challenges*

**Strategic Objectives
(Policy Outcomes)**

*Contingency Planning Guidance
Strategic Planning Guidance
Security Cooperation Guidance*

Planning "Targets"

*Top-level "stretch goals"
for capabilities planning &
risk assessments*

*Traditional Challenge example:
Swiftly Defeat 10-30-30*

Joint Concepts

*How joint commanders
employ capabilities to
achieve effects*

*Joint Operating / Functional /
Integrating Concepts*

Desired Operational Effects

Mission outcomes

Capability Options

*Multiple combinations of means
& ways to perform a set of tasks*

⋮

Looking Across Challenges



POLICY

	Traditional	Irregular	Catastrophic	Disruptive
Strategic Objectives (Policy Outcomes)	Defeat adversaries at the time, place, and manner of our choosing	<i>Assure security conditions for others (indigenous, international, or other USG elements) to stabilize environment in theater of ops (rule of law, nation-state accountability, economic viability)</i>	<i>Deter & Defeat attacks on the Homeland from the commons</i> <i>Assure support to lead-federal agency in broader Homeland security operations</i>	<i>Dissuade potential enemies from seeking asymmetric military advantage</i>
Planning Targets (Stretch Goals)	Seize Initiative -- 10 Meet 1 st SD Objectives -- 30 Engage 2 nd SD -- 30 IAW Contingency Planning Guidance	<i>Sustain distributed expeditionary ops – 300K / 2 years, 200K / 5 years</i> <i>Constitute, train, & equip local force -100K in 180 days</i>	<i>Deny attacks from commons</i> <i>Respond to 3 coordinated domestic CM events involving 100K each</i> <i>Prevent proliferation of WMD through the commons within 12 hours of tasking</i>	<i>Stay 1 generation ahead of potential competitors</i> <i>Provide decade of forewarning of new disruptive technology</i>
Joint Concepts ▪ <u>JOCs</u> - JICs	▪ <u>Major Combat Operations</u> - Forcible Entry - Global Strike - Undersea Superiority - Integrated Air & Missile Defense	▪ <u>Stability Operations</u> ▪ <u>Combating Terrorism?</u> ▪ <u>Irregular Operations?</u>	▪ <u>Strategic Deterrence</u> ▪ <u>Homeland Security</u>	▪ <u>Dissuasion?</u> ▪ <u>Cost-Imposing Approaches?</u>

Illustrative Only

Potential JOCs

Potential JOCs



Way-Ahead

POLICY

1. Define policy outcomes & planning targets for all challenges
2. Develop joint concepts across challenges
3. Refine CBP approach to apportion risk across challenges

4. Test approach against several real-world issues

	Traditional	Irregular	Catastrophic	Disruptive
Strategic Objectives (Policy Outcomes)	Defeat adversaries at the time, place, and manner of our choosing	<i>Assure security conditions for others (indigenous, international, or other USG elements) to stabilize environment in theater of ops (rule of law, nation-state accountability, economic viability)</i>	<i>Deter & Defeat attacks on the Homeland from the commons</i> <i>Assure support to lead-Federal agency in broader Homeland security operations</i>	<i>Dissuade potential enemies from seeking asymmetric military advantage</i>
Planning Targets (Stretch Goals)	Seize Initiative -- 10 Meet 1 st SD Objectives -- 30 Engage 2 nd SD -- 30 IAW Contingency Planning Guidance	<i>Sustain distributed expeditionary ops – 300K / 2 years, 200K / 5 years</i> <i>Constitute, train, & equip local force -100K in 180 days</i>	<i>Deny attacks from commons</i> <i>Respond to 3 coordinated domestic CM events involving 100K each</i> <i>Prevent proliferation of WMD through the commons within 12 hours of tasking</i>	<i>Stay 1 generation ahead of potential competitors</i> <i>Provide decade of forewarning of new disruptive technology</i>
Joint Concepts ▪ JOCs - JICs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Major Combat Operations</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forcible Entry - Global Strike - Undersea Superiority - Integrated Air & Missile Defense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Stability Operations</u> ▪ <u>Combating Terrorism?</u> ▪ <u>Irregular Operations?</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Strategic Deterrence</u> ▪ <u>Homeland Security</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Dissuasion?</u> ▪ <u>Cost-Imposing Approaches?</u>