



LEADERSHIP:

More Than Mission Accomplishment

Colonel Peter J. Varljen, U.S. Army

Leadership ranks as the single most important ingredient to successful warfighting. Yet, feedback from the field indicates that current leader development practices are flawed. Colonel Peter J. Varljen identifies the problem as stemming from an officer evaluation system preoccupied with quantifiable results, and he suggests the solution is to emphasize the intangible results of successful leadership.

The aim of leadership is not merely to find and record failures in men, but to remove the causes of failure.

—W. Edwards Deming¹

THE QUALITY of Army leadership has recently been questioned. If you believe what is being written, there exists in the Army today—

□ A serious generation gap between Baby Boomers and Generation X, resulting in a dramatic increase in captains leaving the Army.²

□ An increasing lack of trust between junior and senior officers, according to Army surveys of majors attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).³

□ An increasing number of senior officers turning down battalion and brigade commands, citing their disillusionment with command climate and senior leadership.⁴

Do these trends indicate that many senior leaders lack the interpersonal skills or the moral conviction necessary to practice sound leadership? Certainly junior leaders' growing disenchantment with senior leaders indicates a problem, if one assumes that perception is reality. The Army can neither confirm nor deny a leadership problem exists because it chooses not to comprehensively or officially evaluate the quality of leadership development and the ef-

fectiveness of its organizations. Instead, it concentrates overwhelmingly on evaluating the quality of leadership development by leaders' product: mission accomplishment. A cascading effect ensues. The Army emphasizes mission accomplishment over other leadership competencies, such as morale and discipline. Mission accomplishment is rewarded as the sole criterion of good leadership. Leadership training and supervisor reinforcement is limited and inadequate. Therefore leaders are not fully developed. Comprehensive leadership is not practiced. Instead, the primary focus is on getting the job done, often at the expense of people and the organization. Subordinates become disillusioned, which precipitates a leadership crisis.

In theory, the Army's popular slogan "Mission First, People Always" is on target. In practice, however, Army leaders often put mission first but neglect people, especially in leader-development programs. That the Army is in the midst of a trust crisis is not surprising. U.S. Army General (Retired) Frederick Kroesen reiterates that this crisis is not new. In fact, during at least six distinct periods in Army history since World War I, lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders caused the so-called best and brightest to leave the Army in droves.⁵ The question is, "What can be done to prevent this cycle from continuing?"

Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, strongly emphasizes mission accomplishment as a leader's key responsibility.⁶ The FM quotes General Douglas MacArthur's warning that "our mission... is to win our wars. . . . There is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed."⁷ Yet, unlike earlier versions, FM 22-100 equally emphasizes that "being *just* technically and tactically proficient may not be enough [and] that the Army would need leaders of competence and character who not only acted to accomplish their mission but also acted to improve themselves, their leaders, their unit, and achieved excellence."⁸ This new balance acknowledges the Army's repeated failure to emphasize adequately the full spectrum of leader attributes, skills, and actions, and it provides a good first step toward correcting this deficiency. But, does it go far enough?

The Army's leadership model relies on the three fundamental tenets of Be, Know, Do. These, in turn, rest on nine supporting pillars of values; attributes; character; knowledge; experience-based training; counseling and mentoring; mission accomplishment; organizational effectiveness (OE); and leader development. Leadership, similar to a physical structure, will only stand firm if its supporting pillars or foundation remain solid. Previous and current senior Army leaders have failed to institute this holistic approach to leadership. Army chiefs of staff have claimed that leadership is key to military success, but they have failed to recognize that unless all of the competencies are solidly developed, the Army leadership structure will collapse. Periodic neglect of multiple leadership pillars has caused cyclical leadership crises. Unless the Army corrects the problem, change will be excruciatingly slow. Failure could mean the loss of at least one generation of effective future leaders and possibly a return to the hollow army.

Measuring Leadership Effectiveness

FM 22-100 defines leadership as "influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."⁹ Yet, if we review most individual evaluation reports, all we find are citations of easily quantifiable tasks—mission accomplishment. We see little mention of more unquantifiable aspects of leadership—contributions regarding purpose, direction, motivation, leader development, and overall organizational improvement.

Admittedly, these soft aspects of leadership are not easily evaluated. How can we reliably measure

We say, "Good leaders will always accomplish the mission." Yet, history provides many examples of poor leaders who accomplished the mission. . . . We cannot sustain an army at peak operational capability by focusing solely on mission accomplishment.

a commander's effectiveness in counseling and developing leadership skills in subordinates when the results might not manifest themselves for years? How can we measure a leader's impact on organizational effectiveness and morale when leaders rotate quickly? How can we measure subordinates' trust and confidence in their commander at the time a commander's evaluation is due? So we say, "Good leaders will always accomplish the mission." Yet, history provides many examples of poor leaders who accomplished the mission. In the meantime, captains are leaving the service while resident CGSC students and those declining command indicate they have lost faith in senior leaders, despite those leaders' impressive records of mission success.¹⁰

We cannot sustain an army at peak operational capability by focusing solely on mission accomplishment. The long-term effectiveness and efficiency of units and the fullest development of leaders require that the Army develop some way to evaluate less quantifiable measures of leader competence. U.S. Army General Bruce Clark's adage, "An organization does well only those things the boss checks," surely applies to leadership processes.¹¹ Until Army leaders begin rewarding intangible indicators of effective leadership, current priorities and behaviors will not change.

Evaluating Leadership

In a recent Officer Evaluation Report (OER) update, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki noted that "selection boards clearly indicate that the OER is giving [the board] what they need to sort through a very high quality officer population and select those with the greatest potential to lead our soldiers.[However,] feedback from the field indicates the OER is not yet meeting our expectations as a leader development tool."¹² Can there be any more reliable admission that the officer evaluation system indicates neglect of essential elements of leadership development?

The current OER does not adequately measure the entire spectrum of leadership competencies that FM 22-100 outlined. The only portions of the OER that receive any credibility are the rater's and the

senior rater's evaluation on "specific aspects of the performance and potential for promotion."¹³ These narratives focus largely on quantifiable aspects of mission accomplishment. Because most promotion or selection boards have so little time to evaluate each record, they almost exclusively consider the senior rater's rating over the rater's, who in a majority of cases knows the individual better. The expediencies of the review process, a process that is

The current OER does not adequately measure the entire spectrum of leadership competencies that FM 22-100 outlined. The only portions of the OER that receive any credibility are the rater's and the senior rater's evaluation on "specific aspects of the performance and potential for promotion." These narratives focus largely on quantifiable aspects of mission accomplishment.

further exacerbated by attempts to normalize the rating across a bell curve or center-of-mass profile, dilute even the narrow evaluation. While the current OER appears to reduce evaluation inflation, it is a poor substitute for honest, well-rounded feedback on all leadership competencies.

Although the new OER attempts to evaluate an officer's character and how well he or she reflects Army values, it reduces the report to a go or no-go evaluation. Moreover, this go/no-go assessment contributes to junior officers' perception of a zero-defect Army because there is no recovery from a no-go check. In "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another 'Bridge Too Far'?", U.S. Army Lieutenant General (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., asserts: "The Army does not enforce guidelines about leadership style except at the extreme edge of the acceptable behavior envelope [and thus] permits a potentially unhealthy range of leader behaviors."¹⁴ Does the Army believe that officers enter active duty either with or without honor, integrity, courage, loyalty, respect, selfless-service, and sense of duty? Do not officers possess degrees of each? Cannot these values be taught, learned, and developed? Does someone deficient in these areas have the opportunity to learn from his or her mistake, to become stronger and more reliable than someone who has never been tested? The Army's current evaluation form does not address these questions, much to the detriment of the profession and its integrity.

The Army's definition of leadership, which emphasizes improving the organization, creates unne-

essarily an ethical dilemma and implies that maintaining the excellence of an organization is not enough. Stating that all organizations must be improved is unrealistic and, at OER time, encourages creative interpretation to reflect significant improvements. Efforts to demonstrate endless improvement serve only to compromise the integrity of everyone involved.

The fixation on superlative ratings—"the absolute best of six battalion commanders"—leads to a self-centered, on-my-watch mentality. Such judgments naturally tend to address a commander's ability to accomplish the mission, often at the expense of the organization and its people. This focus is further exacerbated during short tours when making a mark is often valued over the organization's best long-term interests.¹⁵ This practice persists because organizational effectiveness, leader development, and command climate are not accounted for in rating a leader's performance. Nowhere on the OER is there a specific requirement to evaluate the organization's effectiveness or the quality of subordinate leaders' development. Though these aspects are sometimes included in the performance evaluation's narrative, they appear only because of the rater's initiative to include them.

The latest version of the OER addresses the need to evaluate a leader's attributes, skills, and actions. Yet, it appears that the Army has no clear way to evaluate these dimensions because no guidance or criteria is provided for evaluating them. No indication is offered about how the information derived will be used, and no feedback is given on how the ratings fit into the overall evaluation. Also, these ratings of attributes, skills, and actions are totally subjective and superficial because they require the rater merely to check a block without comment. This cursory assessment is particularly troubling because the Army does have some effective tools and processes to make such evaluations. Examples include command climate surveys, organizational inspection results, and 360-degree leadership assessment tools.¹⁶ But, as long as the boss's evaluation is the only one that counts, it is doubtful that organizational effectiveness or leader development will ever receive their appropriate share of emphasis, time, or resources.

Evaluation Concept Flaw: Top-Down and One-Dimensional

The current evaluation system is one-dimensional. Its top-down rating approach tends to measure whether an individual kept his boss happy. Was the mission accomplished? No one denies that mission

US Army



A 101st Airborne Division soldier briefs his men at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 20 December 2002.

Previous and current senior Army leaders have failed to institute this holistic approach to leadership. Army chiefs of staff have claimed that leadership is key to military success, but they have failed to recognize that unless all of the competencies are solidly developed, the Army leadership structure will collapse.

accomplishment is essential to a military operation, but should mission accomplishment become the sole determinant of a leader's successful performance? An evaluation system that uses mission accomplishment as its sole measure of success—

- Places individual interests (those of the boss and the subordinate) over the organization.
- Provides an incomplete picture of leadership abilities and potential.
- Discourages counseling and organizational skills.
- Compromises integrity by circumventing honest, face-to-face assessments.
- Deters tough, long-term organizational development or team-building processes.
- Fosters a zero-defect mentality.

To avoid these negative consequences, evaluators must expand evaluations to take into account perceptions of subordinates, peers, and the state of the organization, together with the boss's perceptions and with the record of mission accomplishment. Adding these dimensions to the rating process will be cumbersome. Developing the process will take time and

experimentation. Implementing this 360-degree feedback will require considerable confidence-building to overcome concerns that jealous peers or disgruntled subordinates will provide distorted feedback. Until multidimensional feedback is institutionalized, the Army will have difficulty refuting the perception that senior leaders are self-serving, short-sighted, out-of-touch, unethical, and averse to risk.¹⁷ Holistic evaluations will address the shortcomings in morale, organizational effectiveness, and leader development that are increasingly evident.

Leader Development

Leadership cannot be learned solely from a book. Although theoretical knowledge is essential and provides the foundation for understanding leadership, experience-based training is the most effective method for acquiring action-based skills.¹⁸ The Army's leadership training is flawed because it overlooks the importance of experience-based training.

Leadership training in Army schoolhouses is currently based overwhelmingly on book-learning. Exceptions are found in specialty training, such as

Ranger School, the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), and escape and evasion courses, in which soldiers learn technical and tactical skills and experience the challenge of leading in difficult circumstances. Imagine trying to explain, even to

The fixation on superlative ratings—“the absolute best of six battalion commanders”—leads to a self-centered, on-my-watch mentality. Such judgments naturally tend to address a commander’s ability to accomplish the mission, often at the expense of the organization and its people. This focus is further exacerbated during short tours when making a mark is often valued over the organization’s best long-term interests.

another soldier, what it is like going through Ranger School or SFQC. Without realistic, experience-based training of an escape and evasion course, can we even begin to imagine being a prisoner of war or what it feels like to have the bends from not decompressing properly?

Lectures and case studies cannot substitute for experience. The benefits of experience-based learning are evident in the superior performance, cohesion, and esprit de corps of specialty units, such as the Ranger Regiment, Special Forces, and so on. Even highly realistic and stressful joint experiences of Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercises make for effective training.¹⁹ Consider what the quantum leap in effectiveness across the Army would be if experience-based training were applied to attaining organizational and leadership skills.

Today, officers’ leadership training, from commissioning source through the Army War College, comes almost exclusively from books. Summer camps, training exercises, and rotational leadership positions, especially at West Point and in ROTC, offer excellent experience-based opportunities, but this training is inadequate in terms of content, intensity, and personal accountability. Experience-based training remains limited once an officer is commissioned. Leadership training in the basic branch schools continues to be almost exclusively classroom-based. The apparent strategy is to teach what is in the field manual, then reinforce that knowledge through case studies of great battle captains. The Army then says, “Go forth. Emulate what you have read, and be successful leaders.” Learning leadership is not that easy. Book-learning and case studies provide a good foundation, but the practical, individual experience of

actually leading an organization is missing.

A frequent argument for not providing experience-based training opportunities is that real leadership teaching and learning begins in the unit under the watchful eye of a company commander or platoon sergeant. But if the Army does not cultivate or evaluate the full spectrum of leadership skills, what is being passed from one generation of leaders to the next? The fact is that there is little consistency. What is being passed on is a hodge-podge of interpretations, theories, and practices that vary from unit to unit and from leader to leader.

Admittedly, we find many examples in the field where officers get it right—where good on-the-job training and counseling are effectively practiced. Unfortunately, there are many more cases where leaders get it wrong and do a disservice to subordinates. Because there is no consistent Army standard for conducting counseling, leadership development is a hit-or-miss proposition.

Reinforcing Leadership Skills through Counseling

The leader who chooses to ignore the soldier’s search for individual growth may reap a bitter fruit of disillusionment, discontent and listlessness. If we, instead, reach out to touch each soldier—to meet needs and assist in working toward the goal of becoming a “whole person” — we will have bridged the essential needs of the individual to find not only the means of coming together into an effective unit, but the means of holding together.

—General (Retired) Edward C. Meyer.²⁰

Field Manual 22-100 specifically declares that “subordinate leadership development is one of the most important responsibilities of every Army leader. Developing the leaders who will come after you should be one of your highest priorities.”²¹ Leaders are directed to provide good counseling by means of dedicated, quality time to listen to and talk with junior leaders. Leaders should help subordinates develop goals, review performance, and plan for the future. However, officers at all levels agree that good counseling is not being performed routinely or adequately. According to Ulmer, “Mentoring and coaching have long been in the Army lexicon, but their routine use is a localized phenomenon, highly dependent on the interests and skills of unit leaders. There is no meaningful institutional motivation for being a good coach, yet that skill is highly prized by subordinates at every level.”²²

Shinseki concurs: “Officers continue to say that they are not being counseled. Commander’s coun-

seling is key to leader development and remains one of the most important things we do to develop future leaders of our Army. We all need to do better in making this part of the OER function better so that we reinforce our leader development principles. We must slow things down and reenergize the formal and informal counseling of our officers, especially our junior officers who are feeling particularly pressured to leave the force."²³

The Army's difficulty in sustaining an effective counseling program is evident in its lack of an overarching process that can be sustained in a rapidly changing, large geographical area. Sustaining a stable professional counseling relationship is especially difficult in a culture where even stable personal relationships are difficult to maintain. Little or no progress toward constructing this counseling program can be expected because we are not offering at any of the routine career courses experience-based training in developing individual interpersonal skills.²⁴

The Army does, however, offer training in leadership procedures at junior-level schools, where trainers explain forms and work students through case studies. But where are the hard, uncomfortable, risky encounters in which a student feels what it is like to counsel and be counseled? Where are the consequences or feedback for counseling well or for missing the mark? Where else can this occur while in a controlled environment under the guiding hand of a trained instructor? Despite the rhetoric, the Army allocates little time to counseling skills. Nowhere in the military's professional education system have these skills been integrated into experience-based learning objectives of the overall course. Is it any wonder that junior leaders feel uncomfortable with these competencies? And if they do not feel comfortable in a school situation, how can the unit be the primary leadership classroom and the commander the expert instructor?

The difficulty in changing the evaluation paradigm is that most current leaders made it without the benefit of solid counseling, so they have little incentive to overhaul a system that might have worked for them.²⁵ Unfortunately, the system worked for current leaders at the expense of unit effectiveness, command climate, and future leader development.

US Army



Escape and evasion training in Korea, 1999.

Leadership training in Army schoolhouses is currently based overwhelmingly on book-learning. Exceptions are found in specialty training, such as Ranger School, the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), and escape and evasion courses, in which soldiers learn technical and tactical skills and experience the challenge of leading in difficult circumstances. Imagine trying to explain, even to another soldier, what it is like going through Ranger School or SFQC.

Thus, the current leadership crisis is but one symptom of a larger problem. Combining training in using interpersonal counseling skills with a multidimensional evaluation of all leadership competencies is essential for a return to sound leadership practices.

Surveys of current junior officers indicate that they understand what leadership should look like and the standards expected from them. Time and again, officers who become disenchanted say that their leaders are not walking the talk. More important, leaders are not counseling junior officers in the ways and techniques they need to become successful leaders.²⁶

The Army's strength lies in its leaders' dedication to maintaining the highest standards. Leaders do this by adhering to core values, living the leadership attributes, and exhibiting flawless character. The Army has proven itself a mission-oriented institution, and

it has earned world respect through dependable mission accomplishment. Army leadership is the foundation of this great institution, so the Army has expended a tremendous amount of effort and resources to its development. By all accounts, the Army and its sister services are the envy of other government organizations and commercial corporations. However, cracks in the Army's leader development

Implementing this 360-degree feedback will require considerable confidence-building to overcome concerns that jealous peers or disgruntled subordinates will provide distorted feedback. Until multidimensional feedback is institutionalized, the Army will have difficulty refuting the perception that senior leaders are self-serving, short-sighted, out-of-touch, unethical, and averse to risk.

program threaten the Army's institutional core—its leadership. Leader development is not adequately supported by experience-based training to reinforce textbook theories. Counseling is little more than a good idea. Almost every officer at every level acknowledges that good counseling is just not happening. Moreover, most officers recognize that the Army is not teaching, developing, or implementing the knowledge and skills necessary to teach officers how to counsel.

Currently, leadership assessment focuses entirely on what officers accomplish, with little consideration for how the mission is to be accomplished. Little regard is given to the unit's effectiveness as an organization or its sustainability over the long term. Such oversight has led junior and midlevel officers to question senior leaders' values, attributes, and character.

Inadequate leader development produces declining command climates, declining retention of junior officers, and increasing hesitancy of midcareer officers to serve in key leadership positions. At what point do the crumbling pillars and cracks in the supporting foundation cause the leadership structure to collapse completely? More important, what can the Army do to rebuild the shaky pillars and restore leadership to its full potential?

Solutions

The Army has a history of successful experience-based, full-spectrum leadership programs. The largest and most promising was the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program, which flourished from 1975 to 1985. Then, in response to a 1985 Govern-

ment Accounting Office (GAO) report criticizing the Army for not providing leadership-training opportunities to Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), the Army developed a four-level progressive and sequential competency leadership training program.²⁷ Both programs provide examples of successfully teaching and institutionalizing leadership attributes. Such leadership attributes now appear to be deemphasized by mainstream military leaders. Of note, not one book on Shinseki's suggested reading list addresses organizational or leadership processes.²⁸ However, lessons learned from such programs could help solve today's leadership crisis.

OE. Following Vietnam, the Army experienced a leadership crisis while transitioning to an all-volunteer force and confronting the daunting challenges associated with the escalation of the Cold War. At that time, leaders' inadequacies manifested themselves in racial strife, drug use, low morale, and poor discipline.²⁹ The Army's answer to this crisis was Organizational Effectiveness, a business philosophy that emphasized team-building, transformation, organizational learning, and investing in people.

On 1 July 1975, the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) opened its doors at Fort Ord, California. By 1980, more than 570 OE officers had been trained, certified, and assigned to units and schoolhouses. Organizational Effectiveness improved the efficiency of units and the effectiveness of leaders as commanders, trainers, and counselors.³⁰ A 1979-1980 Army study of OE found significant improvement in certain command climate indicators, including morale, supervisory leadership, consideration of subordinates, satisfaction with supervisors, fair treatment from the Army, and job satisfaction.³¹ The demand for OE services and products increased exponentially despite their use being totally voluntary.³²

Between 1980 and 1985, OE found its way into the curriculums of the officer educational system and was becoming institutionalized. The Army was ready to expand OE to encompass larger organizations. Yet, despite its growing success, in 1985 the Army terminated the OE program. The most plausible reason was that personnel and funding resources became convenient bill-payers for building the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), a facility that, interestingly, would develop leader skills that could easily be measured in terms of mission accomplishment.³³

The process of bottom-up development of organizational goals and objectives, based on the organizational strengths and problem-solving processes at

US Army



ROTC cadets attending the National Advanced Leadership Camp, Fort Lewis, Washington, form up for a briefing about rules of engagement for their field training exercise, 26 August 2002.

Today, officers' leadership training, from commissioning source through the Army War College, comes almost exclusively from books. Summer camps, training exercises, and rotational leadership positions, especially at West Point and in ROTC, offer excellent experience-based opportunities, but this training is inadequate in terms of content, intensity, and personal accountability.

the lowest level, was incompatible with the Army's top-down leadership style, which relies on hierarchical structures and centralized control. As OE began to flourish, it conflicted with the traditional military decisionmaking culture.³⁴ Furthermore, in his doctoral thesis "Tops Down Kick in the Bottoms Up," Christopher Paparone says, "Those who controlled the budget of the Army were never convinced to accept the cost and methods of OE without some centralized control and centralized accounting of the efficiency of the program."³⁵ The reason behind this nonacceptance was that leadership processes are hard to define and measure. Also, the Army did not do a good job of measuring, documenting, or marketing their successes. As Paparone says, "The very nature of 'touchy-feely' OE flies in the face of snake-eatin', ass-kickin', REAL Army guys."³⁶

Organizational Effectiveness ceased to exist, but many OE processes and underlying philosophies are still evident in operational planning and follow-on leadership programs. Although there is controversy

over whether OE was headed in the right direction or had grown too big and was abandoning its basic process approach, there is little doubt that the program had growing acceptance and was showing promise in improving organizational effectiveness. Did disbanding this successful program at the time the Army was at its historic best directly contribute to the subsequent decline in leadership proficiency? We have already noted that the Army cannot answer this question, because it has no formalized process to evaluate OE or leader development.

DAC Training. Currently, the Army has an organization dedicated to leader development. Under the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, the Civilian Leadership Training Division's (CLTD) charter provides all Army civilians a common core leadership-training curriculum from entry-level career interns to top-level executive managers.³⁷ CLTD's underlying philosophy, similar to OE's, is that OE is an internal collaborative process that empowers the organization to evaluate itself critically,

set its own priorities, and measure progress toward effectiveness. The program is based on building trust and confidence through cohesion and empowerment. More important, it recognizes and builds on the leadership model's nine supporting pillars (values; attributes; character; knowledge; experience-based

The apparent strategy is to teach what is in the field manual, then reinforce that knowledge through case studies of great battle captains. The Army then says, "Go forth. Emulate what you have read, and be successful leaders." Learning leadership is not that easy. Book-learning and case studies provide a good foundation, but the practical, individual experience of actually leading an organization is missing.

training; counseling and mentoring; mission accomplishment; organizational effectiveness; and leader development) to positively influence professional traits, individual development, and organizational effectiveness.

Ironically, this civilian-oriented program began about the time the Army abandoned its OE program. Two circumstances spurred the civilian-oriented program. First, military personnel perceived that civilian counterparts, especially those who supervised military personnel, lacked leadership skills and were incapable of holding key positions. Second, supervisory civilians complained that they were not offered leadership training opportunities as afforded their military counterparts.³⁸

Since 1986, CLTD has trained more than 68,000 people ranging from interns to Senior Executive Service (SES) and general officers.³⁹ Unfortunately, an attempt to quantify the program's value did not begin until 1997 in response to pressure to reprioritize people and dollars. Yet in the last 3 years, at the junior level (up through General Schedule [GS]-11), end-of-course evaluations noted an average 15.23 percent increase in each of 24 leadership dimensions and attributes. At the senior level (GS-12 and above, and lieutenant colonels [LTC] and colonels [COL]), surveys were solicited from students and their supervisors immediately after the course ended and then 6 months later. Evaluations of key leadership skills indicated an increase of 9.5 percent on 13 leadership behavioral indicators as reported by the supervisor, and a 13.5 percent increase as reported by students. When applied as a ratio between increase of value in salaried skills compared to training costs

per participant, the return on investment was 230 percent or 326 percent, depending on whether the supervisors' or the students' value-added perceptions were used in the calculations.⁴⁰ More important, after students returned to their home stations and as the training's value to the individual and to the organization became increasingly apparent, organizations began sending more people to attend the course. Eventually, organizations requested the course be exported and taught to their entire organization. This began a new dimension of CLTD known as "consulting."

CLTD has developed and conducted everything from basic team-building command climate workshops and command transition, to complete, long-term organizational improvement programs.⁴¹ This has become a genuine bottom-up, incremental, organizational improvement movement that, like OE, is now at the threshold of having an Armywide effect.

Will CLTD be allowed to mature and flourish? Or, will its resources also be cut and given to another program that simply enhances leaders' technical proficiency rather than other, more fundamental leadership attributes and skills? If leadership development were a piece of equipment and evidence suggested that a change in design was warranted, would not the Army upgrade it?⁴² Why then is the Army so reluctant to make such obvious changes in the current leadership training design?

The Way Ahead

Leadership, more than any other skill, is consistently heralded as the Army's load-bearing pillar. When the Army is at its best, leadership is the key ingredient. When it is at its worst, we hear of a leadership crisis. So what makes the difference? Possibly it is leadership training, the effort to hone nonquantifiable leadership skills that do not automatically develop simply because the Army teaches leaders to be technically proficient. Moreover, lack of counseling denies junior officers the opportunity to learn from mistakes and from the experiences of their seniors. Finally, the evaluation process fails to balance all leadership tasks (mission, organization, and leader development), nor does it foster the highest ethical standards. As the Army learned as it repaired itself after the Vietnam war, both individual and unit experience-based leadership training are essential. The Army must maintain balance between mission accomplishment, organizational effectiveness, and leader development.

To develop the next generation of senior leaders, the Army must implement—

□ Leader development doctrine that emphasizes that leadership is more than just accomplishing the mission.

□ Progressive, sequential, experience-based leadership OE training.

□ Multidimensional tools for counseling and evaluating the full spectrum of leadership traits, skills, and actions, and this entire leader evaluation must be part of the promotion, assignment, and school selection process.

□ Specific evaluation measures that hold leaders accountable for organizational effectiveness and subordinate leader development as a criterion equal to mission accomplishment, of which accountability for effective and routine counseling is most critical.

□ Safeguards against future efforts to eliminate full-spectrum leadership development and organizational effectiveness as a bill-payer for other programs, especially after correcting current leadership deficiencies.

History shows at least one thing: every time the Army disregards the relational aspect of leadership—the part that causes human interaction to become effective and organizations to operate efficiently—the Army's decline is sure to follow. All pillars in the leadership model must be strong for

The difficulty in changing the evaluation paradigm is that most current leaders made it without the benefit of solid counseling, so they have little incentive to overhaul a system that might have worked for them. Unfortunately, the system worked for current leaders at the expense of unit effectiveness, command climate, and future leader development.

leadership to function, just as any building must have all its load-bearing walls intact to remain standing.

Will the Army ever learn? Ulmer hit the mark: "Strong conclusions about required competencies and behaviors have rarely produced powerful and integrated new policies designed to support the development of the heralded attributes."⁴³ Solving the leadership crisis will depend on whether Army leaders can understand and institutionalize the leadership model through diligent training and effective, multi-dimensional evaluation of the full spectrum of leadership competencies. More important, the Army must stick to the experience-based leader-development process. Otherwise, the Army cannot reach its full potential or confidently refute the cyclical claims of a leadership crisis. **MR**

NOTES

1. W. Edwards Deming, *Out of the Crisis* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986).
2. Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October 2000), 25; David Wood, "Army Confronting a Crisis of Morale and Purpose in its Officer Corps," 19 December 2000, on-line at <www.newhouse.com/archive/story1a121900.html>, accessed on 2 February 2001.
3. COL Patricia Capin, "Army Team—CGSC Perceptions," e-mail message, 1 December 2000.
4. Wood; CPT John P. Delaney, "Officers declining to attend USAWC," e-mail message to MG Robert Ivany, 15 December 2000.
5. GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, "A Message for the Less than the Best and the Brightest," *Army* (December 2000): 9.
6. U.S. Department of the Army (USDA), Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 31 August 1999).
7. *Ibid.*, 1-1.
8. U.S. Army Center for Army Leadership (CAL), "FM 22-100 Chain Teaching Package," 15 March 2000, on-line at <www.fm22-100.army.mil>, accessed on 7 February 2001.
9. FM 22-100, 1-4.
10. Wood, 3; Capin.
11. Jerry N. Hess, "Oral History Interview with Bruce C. Clarke," 14 January 1970; on-line at <www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarke.htm>, accessed on 7 February 2001.
12. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, "CSA Sends—OER," e-mail message to multiple addressees, 20 November 2000.
13. DA Form 67-9, *Officer Evaluation Report Support Form*, October 1999, Part V b. and Part VII c.
14. GEN Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge Too Far?" *Parameters* 28 (Spring 1998): 10.
15. MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff, "Truth@readiness.mil," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (June 1999), on-line at <www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles99/PROVandergriff.htm>, accessed on 22 January 2001.
16. John L. Rovero and R. Craig Bullis, "Assessing Self-Development," *Military Review* (January-February 1998): 35-40.
17. MG John C. Faith, "Leadership in the 21st Century: Is it Time to Change the System?" *Army* (December 2000): 13.
18. W. Huitt and J. Hummel, "The Behavioral System," *Educational Psychology Interactive*, May 1998, on-line at <chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/behsys/behsys.html>, accessed on 1 March 2001.
19. Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) web page, on-line at <bctp.leavenworth.army.mil>, accessed on 13 March 01.
20. GEN Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff 1979-1983.
21. FM 22-100, C-1.
22. Ulmer, 12.
23. Shinseki.
24. Based on a review of the curricula of the Captains Career Course, the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), the Army War College (AWC), and three branch basic or advanced courses.
25. Faith, 12-13.
26. Capin.
27. CAL, *Civilian Leadership Training Division* web page; on-line at <www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/CLTD/CLTDFR.htm>, accessed on 23 February 2001.
28. Shinseki, "The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List," 7 July 2000, on-line at <www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/CSAList.htm>, accessed on 15 December 2000.
29. Christopher Paparone, "Tops Down Kick in the Bottoms Up" (Ph.D. thesis [draft], Pennsylvania State University, 16 October 2000) 16.
30. Paparone, 17.
31. *Ibid.*, 27.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, 31.
34. *Ibid.*, 36.
35. *Ibid.*, 38.
36. *Ibid.*, 39.
37. CAL.
38. Kenneth Burns, CAL, telephone interview, Fort Leavenworth, 22 November 2000.
39. Frank Loeffler, "Civilian Leadership Training Division," spreadsheet, CAL, Fort Leavenworth, December 2000.
40. Delane S. Keene, "Program Evaluation Briefing, Civilian Leadership Training Division," CAL, briefing slides, Fort Leavenworth, August 2000.
41. Burns.
42. Mark Lewis, "Time to Regenerate," E-mail message to Peter Varljen, 09 January 2001.
43. Ulmer, 7.

Colonel Peter J. Varljen is Commander, 6th Recruiting Command, Las Vegas, Nevada. He received a B.S. from The Citadel and an M.S. from the University of Colorado and from the Army War College. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States and Europe, including Operations Officer, J6, Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC), Heidelberg; Deputy J6 (HQ, Kosovo Forces) Pristina, Kosovo; Battalion Commander, 39th Signal Battalion, Chievres, Belgium; and Operations Officer, Army Digitation Office, the Pentagon.