

Joint Publication 3-40



Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction



8 July 2004



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication sets forth the principles to plan for and conduct operations for combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. This publication addresses joint military actions to eliminate the threat of WMD and their means of delivery to the United States, its forces, and our allies. It provides guidance on joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination. This publication complements joint doctrine promulgated in Joint Publication 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow

the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. J. Keating', written in a cursive style.

T. J. KEATING
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses the Operational Environment for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction**
 - **Covers the Framework Tasks and Planning Considerations for Nonproliferation**
 - **Discusses the Framework Tasks and Planning Considerations for Counterproliferation**
 - **Covers the Framework Tasks and Planning Considerations for Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management**
 - **Provides Guidance on Training and Exercises for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction**
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The Challenge

Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is one of the greatest challenges the United States faces.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a global problem that routinely crosses combatant commands' geographical boundaries. **The challenge of combating WMD necessitates an integrated and dynamic approach that leverages activities of three pillars: nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation (CP), and weapons of mass destruction consequence management (WMD CM).** The increasing availability of highly destructive technology combined with a variety of weapons and means of delivery from both non-state and state actors greatly exacerbates the problem. WMD in the possession of non-state actors could potentially kill large number of people without warning. **The nexus between non-state actors and WMD constitutes one of Department of Defense's top priorities.** Further, states with active WMD programs possess a wide range of employment capabilities. The challenge, here, lies in assessing the intent and capabilities of the state's leadership. The success of combating WMD depends on how effectively combatant commanders apply all three pillars against WMD challenges. NP policy uses the full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to prevent the development and proliferation of WMD. CP applies to those actions taken to prevent proliferation, stop or roll back current WMD programs, defeat delivery systems, and protect US interests from the threat of or use of WMD. WMD CM procedures may be used in the context of military operations to restore necessary capabilities. The United States confronts the threat of WMD through the mutually reinforcing and interdependent

actions across all three pillars: NP, CP, and WMD CM. The US response must integrate all of the capabilities of the NP, CP, and WMD CM framework and demonstrate that US military forces and civilian governments are fully capable, organized, trained, and equipped to deny, destroy, or respond to, and mitigate the effects of, WMD proliferation and use.

Adversary Proliferation Continuum

The development and employment of WMD capabilities is a complex, but identifiable process involving generic activities, which together constitute an adversary's proliferation process.

The sustainment and repetition of the proliferation continuum represents stages adversaries may execute to develop and/or acquire WMD. Adversaries may at any point along the proliferation continuum choose to bypass one of the development steps by acquiring the capability and therefore accelerate the WMD development process. Proactive actions can be taken at every stage of the proliferation continuum process to successfully counter the proliferation of WMD. **The generic activities include: decision; infrastructure and expertise development; production; weaponization; deployment; and employment.** A proliferant group or nation requires the will, equipment, technical knowledge, people, money, and time to successfully develop and sustain this process. This continuum may be encountered in a non-linear fashion, i.e., an adversary may buy a weapon system ready for immediate employment and thus bypass stages such as production and weaponization.

Integrated Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction

The “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” created a paradigm shift in the strategy against WMD.

Prior strategies focused on passive defense and WMD CM activities; while the “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” emphasizes offensive activities. This proactive strategy to combat WMD requires joint force commanders (JFCs) to focus on an integrated approach that emphasizes all three pillars in varying degrees throughout an adversary's proliferation continuum. **All three pillars must be leveraged in order to employ an effective strategy to combat WMD.**

Nonproliferation Pillar

Nonproliferation (NP) efforts consist of the use of the full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to prevent or limit the acquisition or

Nonproliferation is those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls) taken to prevent the proliferation of WMD that seek to dissuade or impede access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. **NP efforts must dissuade or impede the proliferation of WMD, as well as slow and make more costly the access to sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.** Activities shall include providing inspection, monitoring,

development of WMD capabilities.

verification, and enforcement support for NP treaties and WMD control regimes; supporting cooperative threat reduction and export control activities; participating in research activities domestically; conducting military-to-military exchanges; assisting in the identification of potential proliferants before they decide to acquire or expand their WMD capabilities; and, if so directed by the President, planning and conducting denial operations.

The NP pillar consists of three tasks:

Detect and monitor acquisition and development of WMD.

Detect and Monitor Acquisition and Development. Locate, characterize, and track efforts to develop or otherwise acquire WMD in order to identify and exploit proliferation actors' vulnerabilities to deterrence and interdiction, and to support treaty obligations.

Conduct NP operations.

Conduct NP Operations. Use all aspects of military engagement within and across all areas of responsibility (AORs) to deter the proliferation of WMD. Specifically, operations and activities should improve US joint and multinational mission accomplishment capabilities and present a unified front to deter the development or acquisition of WMD.

Conduct security cooperation.

Security Cooperation. Apply all aspects of military engagement within each AOR to dissuade the proliferation of WMD. Maintain and enhance continuous bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve diplomatic and military relations.

Counterproliferation Pillar

The full range of military activities will be used to support counterproliferation (CP) efforts in order to deter, identify, deny, and counter adversary development, acquisition, possession, proliferation, and use of WMD.

Counterproliferation is those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct CP operations, offensive operations, WMD active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our military forces, friends and allies. The full range of operational capabilities will be required to counter the threat and use of WMD. **The objective of CP operations is to deter, interdict, defend, and eliminate the WMD threat across the full range of possible WMD acquisition, development, and employment scenarios.** These capabilities must be fully integrated into existing and emerging military transformation plans and the homeland security posture. In addition, CP must be fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces with the objective of ensuring sustained operations to decisively defeat WMD

armed adversaries. CP operations are intended to reduce the WMD threat and require a balanced and integrated concept of operations to defeat hostile WMD threats.

The CP pillar consists of five tasks:

Detect and monitor.

Detect and Monitor. Locate, characterize, and track indicators and incidents of actual proliferation, employment and/or use of WMD.

Prepare to conduct CP operations.

Prepare to Conduct CP Operations. Plan for use of passive and active measures to defend US forces, friends, allies, and interests against the use and effects of WMD. Escalate deterrence activities through show-of-force options and flexible deterrent options.

Conduct offensive operations.

Conduct Offensive Operations. Conduct measures to eliminate the WMD threat, deter the use, and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD, while being prepared to defend against the use and effects of WMD.

WMD Active Defense.

WMD Active Defense. Employ offensive actions to prevent the conventional and unconventional delivery of WMD. Measures include: detect, divert, and destroy adversary WMD and delivery means while en route to their targets. This may include offensive and defensive counterair operations against aircraft and missiles, and security operations to defend against unconventionally delivered WMD.

WMD passive defense.

WMD Passive Defense. Measures taken to reduce the vulnerability and minimize the effects of WMD employed against key host nation installations, any US installation and facility, ports of embarkation and debarkation.

WMD CM Pillar

Weapons of mass destruction consequence management activities must mitigate the long-term effects of a WMD attack and enable a rapid recovery.

WMD CM is those actions taken to respond to the consequences and effects of WMD use against our homeland, forces and US interests abroad, and to assist friends and allies to restore essential services. **WMD CM operations facilitate a return to stability by minimizing or mitigating the effects of WMD contaminants in order to provide timely assistance to affected public, government, and US military installations.** Operations are intended to assist affected public, government, and US military

installations to reduce a population’s vulnerability to the effects of WMD contaminants by supporting preventive or precautionary measures (e.g., pre-positioning vaccines, first responder equipment, training, personal decontamination supplies; and identifying healthcare facilities), developing and rehearsing response plans/protocols (exercising command and control, identifying and training response personnel, determining legal and physical constraints, determining requirements for attribution and legal prosecution, practicing decontamination procedures, developing reach-back capabilities for technical experts) and restoring necessary life-sustaining services (e.g., medical care, electrical power, and communications and transportation infrastructure).

The WMD CM pillar consists of five tasks:

Assess.

Assess. Collect and analyze information prior, during, and after WMD CM missions on a continuous basis to enable the confirmation, correction, or refutation of existing analyses. In addition, assessment activities provide the ability to predict future requirements in order to make the necessary planning and operational adjustments.

Coordinate Operations.

Coordinate Operations. Coordinate the full range of activities across the spectrum of the WMD CM mission.

Conduct Logistics.

Logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and sustainment of forces for WMD CM activities.

Health Service Support.

Health Service Support. This component of WMD CM provides the application of remedies with the objective of effecting a cure or therapy.

Decontaminate.

Decontaminate. Remove contamination from personnel, equipment, and facilities.

Training and Exercises

Training, exercises, and formal education are vital to ensure that military forces can conduct operations to combat WMD.

Training to combat WMD is necessary to ensure that all personnel understand the threat, principles, agent characteristics, and required tasks. For the most part, training events and exercises to combat WMD will not require unique or stand-alone training events. Most of the skills and equipment supporting tasks to combat WMD can be integrated into existing training events. Combatant commanders should use all aspects of security cooperation activities including security assistance; multinational training, exercises, education,

experimentation; defense and military contacts; foreign humanitarian assistance; and threat reduction measures in their AORs.

Joint, multinational, and Service component training exercises serve as a visible reminder of the US military's capability, and can serve as a continual deterrent to WMD acquisition and use.

CONCLUSION

This publication sets forth the principles to plan for and conduct operations for combating WMD and their means of delivery. The strategy is based on three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. This publication addresses joint military actions to eliminate the threat of WMD and their means of delivery to the United States, its forces and our allies. It provides guidance on joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination.

CHAPTER I OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

“The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

President George W. Bush
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
September 17, 2002

1. The Challenge

a. Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is one of the greatest challenges the United States faces. The proliferation of WMD is a global problem that routinely crosses combatant commands’ geographical boundaries. The increasing availability of highly destructive technology combined with a variety of weapons and means of delivery from both state and non-state actors greatly exacerbates the problem. An adversary’s threat or use of WMD and the proliferation of these agents will continue to challenge commanders at all levels. WMD have the potential to severely disrupt and damage the United States, its forces, allies, coalition partners, and civilian populations of host nations (HNs). Our adversaries may use WMD to inflict casualties on civilian populations, degrade military effectiveness, or counter the conventional military superiority of the United States.

b. The challenge of combating WMD necessitates an integrated and dynamic approach that leverages activities of **three pillars: nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation (CP), and weapons of mass destruction consequence management (WMD CM)**. The success of combating WMD depends on how effectively combatant commanders apply all three pillars against WMD challenges. **NP** policy uses the full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to prevent the development and proliferation of WMD. While NP is principally applied to prevent the acquisition or development of WMD by state or non-state actors during the early WMD development stages, it may also be employed in latter stages. **CP** applies to those actions taken to prevent proliferation, stop or roll back current WMD programs, defeat delivery systems, and protect US interests from the threat of or use of WMD. CP activities are principally applied after adversaries develop WMD but they can also be applied early on in the WMD development and acquisition stages. WMD CM measures are taken to protect domestic and foreign public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a WMD incident. **WMD CM** procedures may be used in the context of military operations to restore necessary capabilities. WMD CM measures are taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD event and to protect US, allied, and coalition forces, domestic and foreign. WMD CM is principally applied after an adversary uses WMD although WMD CM activities can also be useful in dissuading and deterring adversaries from developing and/or using WMD. Each WMD scenario

poses unique challenges and combatant commanders must determine the most effective blend of the three pillar activities throughout the continuum that are best suited to dissuade countries from developing WMD, deter use of WMD by countries/non-state actors that have developed a WMD capability and, if necessary, defeat any state or non-state actor that uses or threatens the use of WMD.

2. Non-state Actors

Individuals and/or organizations that seek to acquire, develop, and/or proliferate WMD pose a grave danger to our national security. WMD in the possession of non-state actors could potentially kill large numbers of people without warning. **The nexus between non-state actors and WMD constitutes one of Department of Defense's (DOD's) top priorities**, and proactive measures must be implemented to prevent them from acquiring and/or developing WMD. The threat is further complicated by the operations of multinational networks, potentially with the support of state resources, which proliferate WMD precursors, technologies, and knowledge. These global proliferation activities employ a combination of secrecy, dispersion, and fiscal resources that must be located, monitored, and ultimately targeted.

NON-STATE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 serve as examples of the global reach some non-state organizations possess. The ability of al Qaeda to plan, rehearse, pre-position personnel and equipment, and ultimately execute a string of coordinated attacks against the US demonstrated an effective operational capability. Similar operational capabilities could be applied to the use of WMD against the US and other international targets. The covert operational capabilities of al Qaeda and other terror organizations pose significant challenges for our detection and monitoring capabilities. State support — direct or indirect — provides these non-state actors an additional capability that is difficult to detect and monitor. In addition, al Qaeda leveraged bin Laden's personal fortune to obtain weapons, materiel, and training required to execute the 9/11 attacks. Additional global funding support came from surrogates around the globe, often through numerous filters to hide the origin of the support. Post-9/11 investigations revealed that Islamic charities based in the US provided fiscal support, both directly and indirectly, to bin Laden's efforts. The combination of these capabilities position al Qaeda to potentially possess the ability to acquire and/or develop and ultimately use WMD.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

3. State Actors

Nation states with active WMD programs possess a wide range of employment capabilities, ranging from the conventional (e.g., ballistic and cruise missiles) to the unconventional (e.g., improvised nuclear devices and crop dusters). **The challenge lies in assessing the intent and capabilities of the state's leadership.**

a. **Global Employment.** The proliferation of missile technology has enabled many states to acquire delivery systems that can range well outside their immediate regions. **A number of states have systems that can strike targets within the US.** Long-range WMD delivery systems enable an adversary to deter US action, deny access to its territory or intermediate staging bases, preempt a pending operation, and strike US allies to affect US policy, or to simply coerce the US to alter its policy.

b. **Regional Employment.** The presence of WMD poses a great challenge within a region. It disrupts US and international efforts to foster stability and curtail proliferation activity. **The perceived imbalance in power can lead to active proliferation among neighboring states** (e.g., Pakistan and India), delivering a severe blow to ongoing NP and CP or other diplomatic and economic efforts. The nonemployment challenges of states possessing WMD (e.g., presence, proliferation, and stability disruption) may prove to be the most challenging and dangerous to US interests.

c. **Fiscal Incentives.** States and non-state actors may elect to exploit their WMD capabilities for financial gain. Such activities can range from providing precursors, technology, and/or knowledge, to actually proliferating WMD. These activities may occur in a multinational network that poses significant challenges to our detection and monitoring capabilities. Proactive measures, including detection, monitoring and interdiction, must be applied to prevent such proliferation.

PROLIFERATION VIA FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

The interdiction of the North Korean marine vessel *So San* in December 2002 provides an example of the application of proactive measures. The ship's cargo was 16 surface-to-surface missile systems (SCUDs), destined for Yemen. While the missiles had no WMD components, the delivery systems themselves were the target of international proliferation treaties and agreements. North Korea's decision to sell its missile (and other military) technology has long been known to serve as a major source of income for the cash-strapped Pyongyang regime. In the case of *So San*, the ship and its cargo were ultimately released and delivered to its intended recipient. North Korea netted some \$20+ million in the process.

The collapse of the Soviet Union provides another example of the financial incentives for proliferating WMD. The WMD stockpiles and perceived lack of accountability procedures, combined with the unemployment or lowered standard of living for security guards, WMD program employees, scientists, and engineers, create an environment conducive to the proliferation of WMD knowledge, technology, and weapons.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

4. Adversary Proliferation Continuum

The development and employment of WMD capabilities is a complex, but identifiable process involving generic activities, which together constitute an adversary's proliferation process. **The**

sustainment and repetition of the proliferation continuum represents stages adversaries may execute to develop and/or acquire WMD (see Figure I-1). Adversaries may at any point along the proliferation continuum choose to bypass one of the development steps by acquiring the capability and therefore accelerate the WMD development process. Proactive actions can be taken at every stage of the proliferation continuum process to successfully counter the proliferation of WMD. The generic activities include: decision; infrastructure and expertise development; production; weaponization; deployment; and employment. **A proliferant group or nation requires the will, equipment, technical knowledge, people, money, and time to successfully develop and sustain this process.** This continuum may be encountered in a non-linear fashion, i.e., an adversary may buy a weapon system ready for immediate employment and thus bypass stages such as production and weaponization. In some cases the early stages of acquisition, facility preparation, and production may be concealed within industrial or agricultural production (so-called dual use materials) or academic institutions making our intelligence efforts more difficult. Many toxic industrial materials exist worldwide and thus can easily be used as weapons or cause problems if released accidentally. An adversary could even use information operations (IO) to open valves or cause other breakdowns in factories or power plants thus creating a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) event without actually possessing such weapons.

5. Integrated Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction

The “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” (December 2002) created a paradigm shift in the strategy against WMD. Prior strategies focused on passive defense and WMD CM activities, while **the new strategy emphasizes offensive activities.** This proactive strategy to combat WMD requires joint force commanders (JFCs) to focus on an integrated approach to disrupt an adversary’s proliferation continuum.

a. **Each pillar (NP, CP, and WMD CM) contains a range of activities that support efforts to combat WMD.** These activities serve as a menu of options that can be employed across the proliferation continuum. The application of these activities against each state and non-state actor must




Figure I-1. Proliferation Continuum

be tailored to ensure the most effective response . By preventing the development and employment of WMD devices, we are simultaneously reducing the chances of having to intercept or absorb and mitigate such devices. Combatant commands should therefore emphasize those that:

- (1) Demonstrate to an adversary the futility of pursuing WMD as a viable threat.
- (2) Deter any usage of WMD through a clear and overwhelming response.
- (3) Should deterrence fail, detect and neutralize an adversary's WMD assets before the weapons reach their targets.
- (4) Ensure US military forces retain the initiative and freedom of action in a contaminated environment.

b. Figure I-2 provides an example of a notional state actor's nuclear weapons development and the optimal application of activities ranging across the three pillars. During the early stages of the process, NP activities are the primary tasks used to dissuade the notional state from developing and/or acquiring nuclear weapons, whereas CP activities serve as a secondary set of tasks. Nonproliferation efforts to dissuade the state actor from developing a nuclear weapons program may include surveillance and tracking of WMD development, enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, conducting information operations, and providing security assistance to the state actor. Additionally, CP activities serve as a set of secondary activities that may be applied during the early development and/or acquisition stages of the proliferation continuum. CP activities may include identifying and characterizing targets for offensive operations; demonstrating active and passive defense capabilities; interdicting the supply of materiel needed to support a nuclear program; conducting preemptive offensive attacks on WMD and related targets; and enhancing WMD elimination capabilities, so as to be ready to deploy in the event the state requests assistance dismantling their programs (rollback).

c. In this example, CP activities become the primary means to combat WMD when the notional state actor begins to reprocess the nuclear fuel for developing weapons. NP activities remain a tool for combatant commanders and they complement the CP activities. For example, offers of security assistance may extend to neighboring states within a region so they have the means to defend (e.g., active defenses) themselves. CP activities may include:

- (1) Identifying and characterizing targets for off-site attack.
- (2) Emplacing and recovering tags, sensors, and monitors.
- (3) Intercepting and diverting shipments of WMD and related technologies.
- (4) Attacking WMD targets.
- (5) Enhancing passive defense capabilities in theater.
- (6) WMD elimination.




Figure I-2. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Integrated Response

d. These activities may include targeting WMD imports and exports. CP and NP activities should focus on preventing state actors from further developing their nuclear weapons programs.

e. **In the event that activities to combat WMD fail and the state actor develops nuclear weapons, combatant commanders must be prepared to prevent and/or defend against a potential nuclear attack.** The CP activities of active and passive defense should be given higher priority along with preparations for WMD CM activities. Figure I-3 provides an illustrative example of the proliferation continuum and the potential combating WMD activities that may be applied.

f. The success of operations to combat WMD requires the coordinated efforts and combined capabilities of each Service and functional component of the joint force. This is achieved through planning, education, training, and close coordination with other DOD, federal, state, and local governments, and applicable nongovernmental organizations. A properly organized, trained, and equipped force helps to deter an adversary from acquiring and ultimately using a WMD.

g. **Commanders must develop programs to combat WMD that integrate all of the DOD security cooperation activities** (multinational exercises, security assistance, multinational training, multinational education, multinational experimentation, defense and military contacts, foreign humanitarian




Figure I-3. Response to Proliferation Continuum

assistance, and Office of the Secretary of Defense-managed threat reduction measures) to deter, defeat, and respond to the WMD threats in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs).

6. Enablers for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

a. **In addition to the three fundamental pillars, a successful strategy requires the employment of key enablers.** Key enablers serve to integrate and balance the components. As the commander’s tools, the key enablers support planning and decision making when considering available operational options to combat WMD. **The key enablers for successful operations to combat WMD are: command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; IO; interoperability; readiness; mobility; and sustainment.** The application of these key enablers integrates the core capabilities into coordinated, synchronized activities and operations, which represent battle management of combating WMD.

b. The United States must deter the acquisition and potential use of WMD through an aggressive and proactive program to combat WMD that addresses every stage of the proliferation continuum (see Figure I-4). The United States confronts the threat of WMD through the mutually reinforcing and interdependent actions across all three pillars: NP, CP, and WMD CM. The US response must integrate all of the capabilities of the NP, CP, and WMD CM framework and demonstrate that US military forces and civilian governments are fully capable, organized, trained, and equipped to deny, destroy, or respond to, and mitigate the effects of, WMD proliferation and use.




Figure I-4. United States Government Response to Proliferation

CHAPTER II NONPROLIFERATION

“To maintain peace, to protect our citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and find ways to keep the peace. Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use...”

President George W. Bush
National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC, May 2001

1. General

NP efforts consist of the use of the full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to prevent or limit the acquisition or development of WMD capabilities. The success of these efforts lessens the threat to civilian populations and the challenges that US forces might face when conducting joint CP efforts.

a. **NP Definition.** Those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls) taken to prevent the proliferation of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.

b. **NP Range of Activities.** NP efforts must dissuade or impede the proliferation of WMD, as well as slow and make more costly access to sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. Activities shall include providing inspection, monitoring, verification, and enforcement support for NP treaties and WMD control regimes; supporting cooperative threat reduction and export control activities; participating in research activities domestically; conducting military-to-military exchanges; assisting in the identification of potential proliferants before they decide to acquire or expand their WMD capabilities; and, if so directed by the President, planning and conducting denial operations.

2. Framework Tasks

a. **NP Pillar.** The NP pillar consists of three tasks:

- (1) **Detect and monitor acquisition and development of WMD.**
- (2) **Conduct NP operations.**
- (3) **Conduct security cooperation.**

b. The tasks and subtasks of the NP pillar (Figure II-1) and definitions follow.

(1) **Detect and Monitor Acquisition and Development.** Locate, characterize, and track efforts to develop or otherwise acquire WMD in order to identify and exploit proliferation actors' vulnerabilities to deterrence and interdiction, and to support treaty obligations.

(a) **Conduct Surveillance and Tracking of Suspected WMD Threats.** Maintain comprehensive and continual intelligence collection on indicators of adversary intentions to develop or acquire WMD. Conduct observation of potential WMD production facilities, materials, precursors, and scientific expertise.

(b) **Emplace and Recover Tags, Sensors, and Monitors in Support of NP.** Emplace and recover electronic intelligence-gathering devices to monitor WMD development, acquisition, and movement in an effort to anticipate adversary intentions.

(2) **Conduct NP Operations.** Use all aspects of military engagement within and across all AORs to deter the proliferation of WMD. **Specifically, operations and activities should improve US joint and multinational mission accomplishment capabilities and present a unified front to deter the development or acquisition of WMD.** Missions must outline the




Figure II-1. Nonproliferation Tasks

United States Government (USG) position emphasizing the negative consequences of the acquisition or use of WMD.

(a) **Maintain Forward Presence.** Maintain forces stationed in the AOR to support ongoing operations, enhance our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to crises, and provide a visible reminder of US military capabilities. Forces will participate in normal operations such as maritime intercept operations, advising militaries of friendly nations, and maintaining or preparing for emplacement of pre-positioned equipment within each AOR.

(b) **Conduct Joint and Multinational Exercises.** Demonstrate USG resolve and commitment to the defense of regional friends by deploying forces to the region for bilateral and multilateral training. **Provide near-continuous presence throughout the AOR.** Improve the capabilities of US forces and those of allies and coalition partners in defense against WMD attack, operating in a CBRN-contaminated environment, and responding to the use of WMD. Improve the capabilities of US forces and those of our allies for potential missions against known WMD production, storage, and command and control (C2) facilities. Demonstrate US ability to conduct operations across the full spectrum of WMD interdiction activities to include monitoring and intercepting of WMD and related materiel shipments. Demonstrate US ability to respond to the use of WMD with overwhelming force to include the ability of US forces to conduct timely and accurate strikes.

(c) **Conduct Information Operations.** Employ all aspects of IO to detect, monitor, disable, discourage, and deny regional proliferation or use of WMD. A focus on military and political contacts within the AOR will reinforce the USG position that the benefits to forgo developing, acquiring, or using WMD far outweigh the costs. IO should include, but not be limited to, a summation of USG WMD policy, information concerning the JFC's ability to defend against the effects of WMD, information concerning US response capability, and the willingness of the USG to mount a massive, overwhelming response if WMD are used.

(d) **Conduct WMD-Related Training.** Plan and implement tailored training programs and initiatives consistent with the regional threat. Specific training may include training theater air missile defense units of regional friends; WMD targeting; interdiction operations; individual and collective protection; WMD CM training; and decontamination.

(3) **Security Cooperation. Apply all aspects of military engagement within each AOR to dissuade the proliferation of WMD.** Maintain and enhance continuous bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve diplomatic and military relations. All activities must highlight the USG position of combating WMD by stressing the negative consequences resulting from the use of WMD and emphasizing the positive ramifications of foregoing such pursuits. The USG and JFCs must stress the positive impact of cooperation with the USG position of combating WMD.

(a) **Conduct Military-to-Military Engagement.** Conduct coordinated activities with ongoing Department of State NP efforts to present a unified US position.

(b) **Provide Security Assistance.** Implement programs and initiatives consistent with the regional threats that provide conventional military assistance and intelligence sharing to enhance regional stability, and secure internationally recognized borders and national sovereignty, and reduce the will of a nation to develop asymmetric capabilities. Commanders should coordinate with HNs, military, civil, and medical planners to conduct operations in the event of a WMD attack. Exercise plans should be developed to include HN CM response capabilities for aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation.

(c) **Support USG NP Efforts.** Provide military assistance to USG informational, diplomatic, and economic measures to prevent the development, acquisition, or transfer of WMD. Combatant commanders, as part of the engagement mission, should consider a mix of enhanced foreign military interaction and modernization activities that support the conduct of continual deterrence. Assure and demonstrate to allies and adversaries the US steadfastness of purpose, national resolve, and military capability to combat WMD. In general, defense combat support agencies and combatant commanders provide direct military support to these efforts with the Services acting as force providers. Specifically, military support consists of four efforts: military support to multilateral regimes; nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation operations; military support for controlling CBRN materials; and reinforcement of US export controls. Details for each of the efforts and their subefforts are:

1. Military Support to Multilateral Regimes. When directed, provide trained and experienced personnel to combatant commanders and combat support agencies that enable them to efficiently support multilateral regimes through inspection, escort, and information collection missions.

a. Conduct treaty inspection, inspection support, and escort missions.

b. Provide timely and accurate information gathered from and in support of inspection and escort missions.

2. Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation Operations. Enable DOD components to effectively and efficiently reduce or reverse WMD programs and assist in shifting resources previously used for WMD programs into non-WMD programs.

a. Support cooperative demilitarization operations.

b. Support WMD audit and examination missions.

c. Conduct civil affairs missions focused on redirecting WMD resources to non-WMD missions.

d. Support border as well as aerial and maritime port inspections of cargo entering and exiting designated areas.

3. Military Support for Controlling Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Materials. Enable DOD elements that own these materials to develop and maintain state of the art controls. Assist security partners with related security technology.

- a. Secure materials in DOD possession.
- b. Assist security partners in their material security efforts.
- c. Account for material.

4. Reinforcement of US Export Controls. Enable DOD to provide assistance to other government agencies to effectively enforce US export controls.

- a. Conduct export control surveillance missions.
- b. Support national intelligence efforts by providing information regarding proliferant country import profiles.

3. Planning Considerations

- a. Specific USG NP activities include:

(1) **Arms Control and NP Treaties.** Arms control and NP treaties and regimes establish global norms against the proliferation of WMD precursors, weapons, their means of delivery, and weapons manufacturing equipment. **Treaties such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention provide international standards to gauge and address the activities of potential proliferators.** International treaties may also provide diplomatic tools and legal recourse to isolate and punish violators.

(2) **Security Assistance.** Through the US State Department's Security Assistance Program, **the United States actively engages in ongoing dialogue with states around the world to dissuade them from acquiring WMD.** The United States also provides assistance with the elimination of existing WMD, and export/import and border control procedures and capabilities. For example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program provides for the destruction and elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other WMD weapons in the former Soviet Union. Through formal security assistance activities, the US military can help potential coalition partners develop the ability to cope with a WMD attack as well as to reduce their vulnerability to armed aggression.

(3) **Technology Security.** **Protecting sensitive technologies includes guarding US technology through physical security and export controls, as well as assisting other countries to monitor and control sensitive technologies and equipment.** Export control regimes such as the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (for nuclear materials), the Missile Technology Control Regime (for ballistic and cruise missiles), the Wassenaar Arrangement (for dual-use materials), and the Australia Group (for biological and chemical weapons materials and equipment) also

work to inhibit the proliferation of WMD technologies and deny access to potential suppliers. Protecting sensitive technologies also includes guarding US technological information through information security programs and limits on foreign disclosure, to ensure military compliance with Federal legislation and regulations implementing the export control regime.

b. **Flexible Deterrent Options.** The Department of Defense supports USG NP efforts and preventive diplomacy by **providing flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that can be readily implemented to deter or forestall a crisis.** The use of FDOs is consistent with US national security strategy, i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another. They can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently. FDOs are primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the political, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power. As such, it is imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational partners in order to maximize the impact of FDOs. Examples of FDOs that involve the military instrument of national power include:

(1) Provide monitoring, inspections, verification, and enforcement support for NP treaties, WMD control protocols, and export control activities.

(2) Help identify potential proliferators before they acquire or expand their WMD capabilities.

(3) Monitor, track, search, and seize suspect cargo.

(4) Establish and maintain military-to-military contacts.

(5) Conduct intelligence and information-gathering activities and share information when authorized.

(6) Forward deploy military forces to support preventive diplomacy by demonstrating the readiness and resolve to defend US interests and maintain regional security and stability. Moreover, such a presence deters proliferation by reducing the incentive for a country to acquire WMD capabilities.

(7) Support humanitarian relief operations in areas where recent conflict might foster a non-state adversary's ambition to acquire or use WMD, thereby indirectly removing the incentive to engage in proliferation activities.

OPERATIONAL EXAMPLE: EXPORT CONTROL

Summary. The German government intercepted approximately 30 tons of sodium cyanide in May 2003. The sodium cyanide, which can be used to make chemical warfare agents, was bound for North Korea.

Narrative. Sodium cyanide is a “dual use” industrial chemical. It is a common industrial chemical used to extract gold and silver from ores, as a fumigant, and in manufacturing certain dyes and pigments, but it is also a precursor used in the production of “G” series nerve agents. Its dual-use character requires an exporter to know the product’s true destination and end-use before an informed decision can be made about export licensing. A chemical production firm believed it was selling a shipment of sodium cyanide to a legitimate company in Singapore when in fact the shipment was to be diverted to Pyongyang.

Conclusion. Export-control regimes, such as the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, all require careful attention to “dual use” exports. What may be a legitimate export to a legitimate user in one case could be a dangerous shipment to a weapons of mass destruction manufacturer in another case.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

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CHAPTER III COUNTERPROLIFERATION

“We must reach a consensus in this country that our response should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures.”

Secretary of State George Shultz,
25 Oct 1984

1. General

CP efforts are focused on both state and/or non-state actors who possess active WMD programs. The full range of military activities will be used to support CP efforts in order to deter, identify, deny, and counter adversary development, acquisition, possession, proliferation, and use of WMD.

a. **CP Definition.** Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct CP operations, offensive operations, WMD active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies.

b. **CP Range of Activities.** The full range of operational capabilities will be required to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and non-state actors against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies. The objective of CP operations is to deter, interdict, attack, and defend against the full range of possible WMD acquisition, development, and employment scenarios. CP must be fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces with the objective of ensuring sustained operations to decisively defeat WMD armed adversaries. CP operations are intended to reduce the WMD threat and require a balanced and integrated concept of operations to defeat hostile WMD threats (see Figure III-1).

2. Framework Tasks

Joint force CP operations require the synergistic execution of five tasks: **detect and monitor, prepare to conduct CP operations, conduct offensive operations, WMD active defense, and WMD passive defense.** The tasks and subtasks of the CP pillar are discussed below.

a. **Detect and Monitor.** Locate, characterize, and track indicators and incidents of actual proliferation, employment and/or use of WMD. In support of the Detect and Monitor task, joint force operations should accomplish the following subtasks.

(1) **Conduct Surveillance and Tracking for WMD Active Defense Operations.** Maintain comprehensive and continual intelligence to determine adversary intentions to use and actual employment of WMD. Indications of inbound WMD threats are time sensitive and will be used to intercept and/or destroy the threat.




Figure III-1. Counterproliferation Tasks

(2) **Identify and Characterize Targets for Attack.** Gather intelligence to support targeting of WMD or related targets with specific consideration for location, vulnerabilities, and collateral damage effects.

(3) **Conduct Surveillance and Tracking of Known WMD Threats.** Maintain comprehensive and continual intelligence of production, storage, transport, weapon platforms, subject matter experts, and supporting infrastructure of WMD systems and dual-use technology for the purpose of supporting counterproliferation missions. Intelligence of known WMD threats supports offensive operations and passive defense operations.

(4) **Emplace and Recover Tags, Sensors, and Monitors in Support of CP.** Emplace and recover electronic intelligence-gathering devices to monitor WMD storage, transport, or use and anticipate adversary intentions.

b. **Prepare to Conduct CP Operations.** Plan for use of passive and active measures to defend US forces, friends, allies, and interests against the use and effects of WMD. Escalate deterrence activities through show-of-force options and FDOs. Include all measures short of combat operations that deter further proliferation and prepare US and allied forces for offensive and defensive CP operations, including measures that posture US forces for successful execution of military operations in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment.

(1) **Demonstrate the Ability to Deliberately Plan and Conduct Operations.** Conduct training, exercises, and other focused activities that display our abilities to adversaries to: deliberately plan and conduct operations to interdict or negate efforts to acquire, develop, or produce WMD; protect against the effects of WMD; deliberately plan and conduct operations in response to the use of WMD; negate the effects of WMD; and, interrupt key information systems.

(2) **Pre-stock and Pre-position Equipment and Supplies.** Pre-stock and pre-position equipment and supplies (to include all types of WMD defensive equipment and supplies) to support ongoing and subsequent operations.

(3) **Employ WMD Detection and Early Warning.** Employ WMD detection and early warning devices and facilitate mitigation of attack effects. Institute medical surveillance and environmental surveillance systems to provide indications of radiological, chemical, or biological attack and to initiate appropriate medical response.

(4) **Support USG CP Efforts.** Support all USG measures to roll back the proliferation process through treaty support and inspections to actively encourage the downsizing and eventual elimination of WMD. Should the conduct of normal peacetime operations fail to deter a regional actor from pursuing the development or acquisition of WMD, combatant commanders must be prepared to apply more compelling deterrence measures (e.g., shows of force, repositioning of defensive assets, or accelerated security assistance missions) designed to communicate clearly and unequivocally the USG's intention to terminate the proliferation process.

c. **Conduct Offensive Operations.** Conduct measures to eliminate the WMD threat, deter the use, and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD, while being prepared to defend against the use and effects of WMD.

(1) **Interdict Transfer of WMD and Related Technologies.** Operations to track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or stop trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, related materials, technologies and expertise to/from state and/or non-state actors of proliferation concern. Operations will include redirection of international shipments of unauthorized WMD, related material, or WMD development information sources.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Summary. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President George W. Bush during a speech in Poland on 31 May 2003, is designed to enhance and expand international efforts to impede and interdict the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of concern. Interdiction of WMD shipments by air, sea, or land is the foundation of the new strategy. Interdiction includes both diplomatic and military activities. Overall, the PSI expands the range of interdiction options in an effort to combat WMD. PSI leverages proactive measures found in both nonproliferation (NP) and counterproliferation (CP) activities. The detection and monitoring of potential WMD transshipments activities are characteristic of both NP and CP and the actual interdiction of WMD transshipments constitutes an offensive activity supporting CP efforts.

Narrative. The PSI calls for more aggressive international action to halt trade in WMD. A core group of nations began coordinating intelligence efforts and organizing military interdiction exercises. Plans call for member states to strengthen trade inspections, share information about suspected shipments, and step up searches and seizures of ships, planes, and vehicles believed to be smuggling WMD. Successful implementation of the PSI relies on systematic application of diplomatic, operational, legal, and intelligence plans. In addition, the overall success of PSI efforts will be greatly enhanced with the support of additional key states such as Russia and China, and other critical regional powers. The PSI is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD and related materials worldwide. As an activity rather than an organization, the PSI builds on efforts by the international community, including existing treaties and regimes, to prevent proliferation of such items. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements by the G8 (G8 includes the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in combating WMD and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing

international norms, and to profit from such trade, require new and stronger actions by the international community. PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD and related materials, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:

a. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, to interdict the transfer or transport of WMD and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. “States or non-state actors of proliferation concern” generally refer to those state or non-state actors who are engaged in proliferation through:

(1) Efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.

(2) Transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD or related materials.

b. Adopt streamlined procedures for the rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, while protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

c. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

d. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:

(1) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.

(2) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

(3) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.

(4) To take appropriate actions to:

(a) Stop and/or search in their territorial waters, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

(b) To enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.

(5) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to:

(a) Require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified.

(b) Deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.

(6) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

(7) During a speech to the UN on 23 September 2003 in New York, President George W. Bush called on member states to pass a resolution that calls for the criminalization of proliferating WMD and related material.

Conclusion. Interdiction operations span the entire spectrum of an adversary's proliferation activities, starting from considering the development of a WMD program to actual use of WMD. PSI serves as a means to interdict WMD transshipments on a global scale by leveraging the support of key international partners. These PSI efforts leverage both NP and CP activities.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

(2) **Eliminate WMD Capability.** Operations to support the systematic seizure, security, removal, disablement or destruction of a hostile state or non-state actor's capability to research, develop, test, produce, store, deploy, or employ WMD, delivery systems, related technologies, infrastructure and/or technical expertise.

(a) **Isolation.** Isolation actions are the overall encirclement of the WMD program. An interagency approach contributes to encirclement and reduces the probability of exploiting only part of the network while the remaining elements escape the tactical isolation of the exploitation process. This includes the personnel, equipment, agents and delivery systems that may not be encircled at the tactical level when an operational force secures a sensitive site. This includes planning and redirection of assets for the worst case scenario where looting, cross border proliferation, exfiltrations of sensitive plans and personnel or mobile labs that are not in the vicinity of the actual sensitive site exploitation.

(b) **Exploitation.** It is conducted as part of the combatant commanders sensitive site exploitation operations. Its purpose is to locate, characterize, secure, and render safe the adversary's WMD materiel, weapons, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. Secondary purposes are to collect appropriate forensic evidence and intelligence. Specialized teams conduct a technical assessment of a site to determine if it contains evidence of WMD. A more explicit and detailed exploitation (documents, personnel, sampling, etc.) of the site is then conducted if it contains any WMD activity. Exploitation may include separate operations to dismantle WMD materiel, weapons, or missiles that provides an immediate threat to friendly forces.

(c) **Destruction.** Destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer or otherwise verifiably dispose of the adversary's WMD material, weapons equipment, and infrastructure, to include dual-use assets, infrastructure and capabilities. Destruction often involves consolidation of WMD materiel in specified locations where demilitarization operations take place. Demilitarization operations may be subject to monitoring in accordance with existing international treaties or agreements. Specific guidance from the national level will be provided. Execution of guidance is carried out by the combatant command in accordance with approved plans and policies.

(d) **Monitoring and Redirection.** Convert WMD programs, personnel, sites and facilities to prevent transfer, reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities.

(3) **Attack WMD and Related Technologies in Transit.** Employ offensive capabilities against in-transit WMD and related technologies to deny, degrade, disable, damage, or destroy WMD while minimizing collateral effects or unintended agent or material release. Examples include attacks upon maritime, air, or ground transport of WMD and related technologies or mobile WMD platforms such as SCUD missiles and transporter-erector-launchers.

(4) **Attack WMD Targets.** Employ offensive capabilities against WMD targets to deny, degrade, disable, damage, or destroy WMD targets at fixed locations while minimizing collateral effects or unintended agent or material release.

(5) **Attack WMD-Related Targets.** Employ offensive capabilities against WMD-related targets and supporting infrastructure at fixed locations. WMD-related targets may include power generators for production plants, dual-use production facilities, nuclear energy plants, C2 nodes, and other high value targets.

d. **WMD Active Defense.** Employ offensive actions to prevent the conventional and unconventional delivery of WMD. Measures include: detect, divert, and destroy adversary WMD and delivery means while en route to their targets. This may include offensive and defensive counterair operations against aircraft and missiles, and security operations to defend against unconventionally delivered WMD.

(1) **Defend Against Missile Threats.** Conduct air defense operations against high altitude and ballistic missile threats.

(2) **Defend Against Air Threats.** Conduct conventional air defense operations against aircraft and cruise missiles.

(3) **Conduct Security Operations to Defend Against Unconventional Threats.** Employ measures to defend against covert and terrorist tactics to include ground-based devices.

e. **WMD Passive Defense.** Measures taken to reduce the vulnerability and minimize the effects of WMD employed against key HN installations, any US installation and facility, and ports of embarkation and debarkation. Combatant commanders should initiate WMD CM planning and integration. Combatant commanders should employ measures that may include early and avoidance warning, operations security, dispersion, individual and collective protection, WMD medical response, detection, reporting, and decontamination. The following outlines the tenants of CP passive defensive measures:

(1) **Sense.** Continually provide the information about the WMD hazard at a time and place by early detection, identifying, and quantifying hazards (in all physical states) in air, water, on land, personnel, equipment or facilities.

(2) **Shape.** Describe the WMD hazard to the commander. In conjunction with other information this creates a state of situational understanding, which is crucial to battle management. This allows the JFC to make informed use of offensive operations, WMD active defense operations and passive defenses, to optimize our capability to operate in the CBRN environment.

(3) **Shield.** Shield the force from harm caused by WMD hazards by hardening systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, and applying prophylactics to prevent or mitigate weapons effects on personnel and equipment.

(4) **Sustain.** Continue operations through the conduct of decontamination and medical actions that enable the quick restoration of combat power, maintain/recover essential functions, and facilitate the return to pre-incident operational capability as soon as possible.

3. Planning Considerations

a. **CP operations require timely intelligence and thorough planning throughout the range of military operations.** Nonproliferation operations primarily focus on continual deterrence. WMD CM operations usually focus on mitigation operations and CP focuses primarily on the enhanced deterrence and combat operations. Although the three pillars usually focus on these phases, they are not mutually exclusive and an effective program to combat WMD requires a synchronization of all these pillars.

b. Planning considerations include:

(1) Intelligence gathering and dissemination

(a) What intelligence is available to verify that the facility is currently producing WMD? The facility may have produced in the past but unless there is irrefutable evidence then the public perception problems which followed the “baby milk factory” bombing of Iraq or the “pharmaceutical plant” in Sudan are inevitable. There must be solid evidence to support the actions taken.

(b) What assets are available to conduct battle damage assessment? Commanders require the ability to assess the damage in order to ascertain the extent of damage or destruction to the target and surrounding area.

(c) Evidence collection. Is there a requirement to retain some agent/nuclear material after the attack for the “court of public opinion?” The planners need to know prior to developing the plan whether there is a requirement for some agent/nuclear material to remain after the attack because this will affect the means of attack, agent defeat criteria and the type of ordnance and additional forces required.

(2) Operational planning

(a) Successful CP operations require the integration of the entire staff and synchronization of both CP and WMD CM planning early in the process.

(b) Consideration should be given to interagency coordination.

(c) Task organization. No single organization is capable of conducting the full range of CP operations. Commanders must therefore decide if a task force is required to support the CP operations.

(d) Rules of engagement need to be defined during the early planning stages.

(e) **One of the operational decisions is the type of attack.** The course of action analysis should consider both covert and overt operations. Covert and overt planning incorporates completely different planning criteria so this decision must be made early in the planning cycle.

(f) Target selection. **Planners will quickly identify whether to strike the actual WMD facility or a separate offset target.** Once the target is selected the target will be further refined to determine what portions of the facility accomplishes the mission without releasing the agent/radiation into the atmosphere. If the facility is deemed appropriate for attack then the decision of where to strike is determined. In some instances a commander may want to destroy supporting infrastructure without attacking the portion that actually stores the agent/nuclear material due to the potential for release.

(g) Off site or on site. Commanders should determine appropriate engagement scenarios. Potential options include a tomahawk land-attack missile strike from hundreds of miles away, an Air Force strike, or soldiers on the ground. All scenarios have their risks and limitations.

(h) Ordnance selection. The weaponeer must understand the commander's intent for the target. **What is the agent defeat criteria?** In some cases the intent is to consume the entire agent in the ensuing fireball while other cases may require some evidence remaining to prove that the WMD was being produced. Too much ordnance may destroy any residual evidence. Too little ordnance may release some of the agent/nuclear material into the atmosphere.

(i) Collateral damage. The early integration of WMD CM planners will identify the worst case local as well as downwind hazards using effects modeling and help the commander refine the targeting. This modeling may also assist in determining the acceptable risk and any requirement for prior notification of a pending strike.

(j) Retaliatory strikes. Regardless of the success of the strike there is the possibility for a retaliatory strike. WMD CM planners need to assist in identifying WMD defense shortfalls and recommend actions to rectify those deficiencies.

(k) Storage and security. Initial efforts should focus on securing suspected WMD sites to prevent unintended destruction, looting (with its associated danger to the civilian population), or transfer of WMD-related materials. Guidelines for storage and security of confiscated and/or captured materiel may be subject to international treaties or agreements. It may be more cost and manpower effective to consolidate suspect materiel into one or a handful of sites. Proximity of storage to demilitarization (destruction) facilities will also reduce the risk of losing control of suspect materiel and facilitate the demilitarization process.

(l) Information Operations and Psychological Operations. Prior to the initiation of combat operations, a deliberate IO effort may be launched targeting government and military leadership and technical experts associated with the WMD programs. The key themes in the IO efforts should be to:

1. Dissuade the use of WMD against coalition forces.
2. Dissuade the transfer of WMD weapons, technology, or information to other states or hostile non-state entities.

3. After the cessation of combat operations, an effective rewards program — with adequate explanation of who may, or may not be, criminally liable — to entice personnel associated with WMD programs to cooperate with coalition forces charged with locating and eliminating WMD assets.

(3) **Joint or multinational operations.** Roles for coalition partners and allies. Many of the technical skills required to support elimination operations are low density and very costly to establish and maintain. The large demand for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), technical escort, intelligence, and scientific support may preclude some states from actively participating in the effort. **There are, however, a number of supporting roles for which coalition partners and allies are perfectly suited:** site and team security, transportation, medical support, language support, and intelligence. The presence of international players increases the legitimacy of WMD elimination efforts and fosters greater cooperation in the overarching CP challenge. Special consideration must be given to the classification level of intelligence supporting elimination operations. The US has standing agreements with some states that allow the sharing of high-level intelligence (special category, etc.), while others are denied access by the ‘not releasable to foreign nationals’ caveat. A systematic process must be implemented to determine classification and releasability guidance for coalition partners and allies.

(4) **Logistics**

(a) As with all operations, the logisticians need to be fully engaged for both feasibility and responsiveness to any changes in the plan.

(b) Reception and integration of national level assets.

(c) Mission specific equipment. Much of the equipment associated with CP operations is unique and low density. Some items may require specialized logistic support for sustainment throughout the mission.

(5) **Public Affairs**

(a) The public affairs portion is crucial to the success of the overall operation. We can win the battle and lose the war of public opinion. A proactive public affairs plan will keep everyone on message during the inevitable twist of circumstances following the strike.

(b) The pursuit of WMD attracts national and international media attention. An essential component of a successful public affairs plan includes the provision for delivering updates on the progress of CP efforts in a way that will not interfere with intelligence gathering and other goals of the plan. Regular media events outlining elimination plans and progress reports can help avert unintended (and unhelpful) releases.

(6) **Training**

(a) Deploying units require time to assemble, train, and rehearse for their respective elimination missions due to the ad hoc nature of WMD elimination efforts.

(b) Planners should also factor in time for any theatre specific training required prior to or immediately after deployment.

MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS: SO SAN (DEC 2002)

Summary. The North Korean (Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]) marine vessel *So San*, an 83-meter long cargo carrier, was interdicted via a noncompliant boarding on 9 December 2002, in waters south of Yemen. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) tracked the *So San* throughout its voyage. Spanish forces conducted a noncompliant boarding of the *So San* and discovered 16 SCUD missiles and containers of related parts and fuel that were eventually released for delivery to Yemen. The operation was the first implementation of the latest weapons of mass destruction (WMD) interdiction strategy (13 November 2002).

Narrative. Indications of *So San's* cargo and suspected destination did not generate much attention within the United States Government (USG). While it did fall into the category of consideration for interdiction, the earliest reports did not provide enough detail to justify interdiction. Additional information supported early indications that the *So San's* cargo was in fact SCUD missiles and related support materiel destined for Yemen. The *So San* sailed on 13 November 2002, under a DPRK flag and with the name of its homeport, Nam Po, clearly stenciled across its stern. USPACOM monitored the *So San* throughout its voyage in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR). The *So San* anchored in the vicinity of Singapore (in Malaysian waters) on 27 November. Visual contact with *So San* was maintained and the vessel reportedly reflagged under Cambodian colors and changed its homeport placard on the stern to read 'Phnom Penh.' The *So San* possessed a valid Cambodian registry, but its reflagging caused the USG to consider the vessel 'stateless.' After an 8-hour layover, *So San* resumed course to Yemen. USPACOM continued to track the *So San* and discovered the vessel was aware of being tracked. USPACOM conducted a seamless handoff for tracking the *So San* once the vessel entered the USCENTCOM AOR. In conjunction with tracking the *So San's* movements, the USG also explored the legal parameters for conducting interdiction operations, including both compliant and noncompliant boarding. Available information indicated that the DPRK and Yemeni transaction constituted legitimate state-to-state commerce. While the suspected cargo constituted the centerpiece in several international counterproliferation (CP) treaties and agreements, none of them were binding. Implementation of interdiction courses of action ultimately hinged on securing legal justification, freedom of navigation, and the desire to exercise the new interdiction policy. The *So San* was interdicted via a noncompliant boarding on 9 December by the Spanish vessels *NAVARRA* and *PATINO*, which were part of Combined Task Force 150, a multinational task group assigned the mission of executing maritime interdiction operations in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665 (the Iraq sanctions imposed at the end of Operation DESERT STORM). Numerous attempts to get the *So San* to consent to a boarding were unsuccessful. The *So San* intentionally veered off course

in order to avoid boarding attempts by the Spanish vessels. Warning shots were fired across the bow of *So San*, and the crew eventually conceded to boarding. A review of the *So San*'s documents validated its Cambodian registration and also specified that its cargo consisted of concrete. Inspection of the cargo compartments revealed sacks of concrete, but further inspections uncovered numerous containers that were intentionally hidden underneath the concrete. The inspections revealed 16 SCUDs (B and C variants) and approximately 40 containers of fuel and missile related parts. A US explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team and special operations forces assisted to characterize and identify the missiles and components. The *So San*'s manifest did not address these items and the crew denied any knowledge of anything except the concrete.

Conclusion. The interdiction of the *So San* was accomplished using a standing combined task force, with existing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for maritime interception operations. The existing TTP significantly reduced the amount of time needed to plan, coordinate, and execute the *So San* interdiction operation. The intercept force was augmented by technical expertise from the US to assist in the characterization of the suspected cargo. The *So San* interdiction operation exemplifies the type of efforts required to support the task of offensive operations and both its associated subtasks: intercept and/or divert shipments of WMD-related technologies and seize WMD and related technologies.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

In 1962, the United States military prepared an option to conduct weapons of mass destruction (WMD) interdiction operations on the island of Cuba that would prevent the Soviet Union from operationalizing nuclear-armed ballistic missiles deployed there. On 22 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy addressed the American people that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a rogue Cuban government was unacceptable. "We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril," he announced, noting nuclear weapons were so destructive that "any substantial increased possibility of their use" constituted a "threat to the peace". Subsequently, the President chose to impose a naval "quarantine" of the island (maritime interception operations of Soviet freighters bound for Cuba with missiles) instead of interdicting WMD on the island. Though the term would not be invented for another 31 years, the desired "counter-proliferation" results were achieved. Cuba's potential WMD capability was rolled back.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

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CHAPTER IV CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

“Damage by enemy action stands on a different footing from any other kind of damage because the nation undertakes the task of defending the lives and property of its subjects and taxpayers against assaults from outside.”

Winston Churchill
To the House of Commons, 5 Sept 1940

1. General

The US must be prepared to respond to, and mitigate the effects of WMD use, both domestically and internationally, against our citizens, our military forces and those of friends and allies. **WMD CM activities must mitigate the effects of a WMD attack and enable a rapid recovery.** Effective WMD CM capabilities serve as both a deterrent to adversaries considering the potential use of WMD and, in the event that an adversary uses WMD, as a means to rapidly recover. DOD serves as a supporting agency for WMD CM operations. The State Department is the lead federal agency for foreign WMD CM and the Department of Homeland Security for domestic WMD CM.

a. **WMD CM Definition.** Those actions taken to respond to the consequences and effects of WMD use against our homeland, forces and US interests abroad, and to assist friends and allies to restore essential services.

b. **WMD CM Range of Activities.** WMD CM operations facilitate a return to stability by minimizing or mitigating the effects of WMD contaminants in order to provide timely assistance to affected public, government, and US military installations. Operations are intended to assist affected public, government, and US military installations to reduce a population’s vulnerability to the effects of WMD contaminants by supporting preventive or precautionary measures (e.g., pre-positioning vaccines, first responder equipment, training, personal decontamination supplies; and identifying healthcare facilities), developing and rehearsing response plans/protocols (exercising C2, identifying and training response personnel, determining legal and physical constraints, determining requirements for attribution and legal prosecution, practicing decontamination procedures, developing reach-back capabilities for technical experts) and restoring necessary life-sustaining services (e.g., medical care, electrical power, and communications and transportation infrastructure).

2. Framework Tasks

a. The ultimate goal of WMD CM is to minimize pain and suffering, restore essential infrastructure as soon as possible, and respond in such a manner that the minimal impact serves as a deterrent for future domestic and international WMD attacks. Every incident will be different, but the underlying concepts will remain constant. A robust WMD CM program serves as a deterrent against future WMD use.

b. The WMD CM pillar entails five tasks: Assess, Coordinate Operations, Conduct Logistics, Health Service Support, and Decontaminate (see Figure IV-1).




Figure IV-1. Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management Tasks

c. **Assess.** Collect and analyze information prior, during, and after WMD CM missions on a continuous basis to enable the confirmation, correction, or refutation of existing analyses. In addition, assessment activities provide the ability to predict future requirements in order to make the necessary planning and operational adjustments. Associated subtasks include:

(1) **Threat.** Continually compile and examine all available information and indicators concerning potential WMD threats.

(2) **Readiness.** Constantly determine the ability of the forces to meet the demands of the full range of WMD CM activities in conjunction with civilian response agencies and governments. Consideration must be given to determining the capabilities required to execute the WMD CM missions and also the ability to integrate and synchronize existing WMD CM and support entities.

(3) **Plans and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).** Provide clear and executable plans and TTPs that span all activities for WMD CM missions. Special consideration should be given to coordinating and integrating civilian and foreign entities in WMD CM operations to maximize existing resources and personnel. Plans must address the legal requirements and limitations on providing support to foreign entities and domestic civil authorities.

(4) **Detection and Analysis.** Detect, identify, characterize, track, and analyze all WMD events to predict injury, illness, or death of personnel, damage or loss of equipment or property, or mission degradation.

(5) **Surveillance.** Systematically observe the affected area across all domains using all available surveillance WMD CM assets.

d. **Coordinate Operations.** Coordinate the full range of activities across the spectrum of the WMD CM mission. Subtasks include:

(1) **Exercises.** Conduct WMD CM exercises that involve planning, preparation, and execution elements. WMD CM activities require extensive cooperation and interoperability among the Services, joint forces, multinational forces, and a wide variety of government agencies and civilian organizations.

(2) **Warning and Reporting.** Communicate and acknowledge dangers implicit throughout the full range of WMD CM activities for the purpose of increasing the readiness to respond in the most effective manner possible.

(3) **Command, Control, and Synchronization.** Exercise authority and direction over assigned and attached forces and coordinate their activities to effectively meet the full spectrum of WMD CM tasks.

(4) **Security and Control.** Implement measures and activities to protect personnel and affected areas across all WMD CM activities.

(5) **Forensics.** Implement accepted protocols of evidence collection and analysis which withstands domestic and international legal and political debate, to attribute the agent and/or perpetrator(s) of a WMD attack.

(6) **Sample Collection and Packaging.** Implement internationally recognized sampling and packaging protocols of CBRN samples. Samples will be used to determine medical treatment.

(7) **Public and Civil Affairs Activities.** In accordance with DOD policy, conduct continuous strategic and operational public information, command information, and community relations activities. Efforts include the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to warn, inform and maximize operational effectiveness.

e. **Logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and sustainment of forces for WMD CM activities. Associated subtasks are:

(1) **Pre-position Material.** Emplace equipment or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time and to ensure timely support of a specific force during the initial phases of an operation.

(2) **Transport Casualties, Remains, and Samples.** Prior to commencement of movement, all WMD materials/samples/unexploded ordnance (UXO)/casualties will be assessed by the transporting unit using acceptable (See AR 385-61) devices or methods to ensure the load is secure and does not pose a contamination danger. Upon arrival at the designated end site (laboratory facility) an additional assessment must be completed using the previously stated methods to ensure the integrity of the load. Both samples should be recorded and passed on to the receiving parties/personnel. All routes traveled must be documented and monitored for inadvertent contamination. The level of monitoring will be based on minimum available assets. Strict control of the chain of custody must be constantly maintained throughout the entire transportation process.

(3) **Personnel and Materiel Deployment.** Coordinate the movement of forces and materiel into, within, or out of an area affected by a WMD attack/incident.

(4) **Facilities and Materiel Maintenance.** Conduct emergency and routine actions to maintain personnel and materiel in a safe and serviceable condition prior to, during, and after a WMD attack/incident. This includes inspection, testing, repair, and rebuilding.

(5) **Support to WMD Disaster Assistance Operations.** Measures taken by specialists before, during, or after a WMD attack/incident to reduce the probability of damage, minimize its effects, and initiate recovery of personnel and the surrounding community to pre-attack normalcy. Efforts include those Red Cross type functions not covered in other areas of the response (e.g., billeting, messing, comfort/counseling, access to emergency funds, etc.).

f. **Health Service Support.** This task of WMD CM provides the application of remedies with the objective of effecting a cure or therapy.

(1) **Medical Research.** Develop pretreatments, prophylaxis, vaccines, protective skin barriers, rapid medical assessment processes, and post treatments for first responders.

(2) **Medical Diagnosis.** The capability enables the implementation of Food and Drug Administration-approved capabilities to support the initiation of prophylaxis and/or treatment to WMD incident casualties.

(3) **Immediate Response.** Actions taken by first responders to save lives or reduce pain and suffering.

(4) **Triage.** Implement processes and systems to effectively allocate resources. These are designed to produce the greatest benefit from limited treatment facilities for casualties by giving full treatment to those who may survive and not to those who have no chance of survival or will survive without treatment.

(5) **Casualty Treatment.** Perform WMD-casualty care postattack to include medical postexposure treatments and personal exposure measuring devices. Measures must also include contaminated casualty triage, handling and treatment.

g. **Decontaminate.** Remove contamination from personnel, equipment, and facilities.

(1) **Mitigation.** Lessen the severity or intensity of the contamination. This is similar to operational decontamination.

(2) **Emergency Decontamination.** Remove contamination from personnel to save lives and facilitate rapid medical attention without transferring to other personnel or equipment. Decontaminate individuals and materiel upon becoming contaminated. It is performed to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit the spread of contamination. Decontaminants should be safe for use on skin and wounds.

(3) **Restorative Operations.** Restore the personnel, equipment, facilities and community function to a pre-attack state as rapidly as possible. Activities will eliminate the contamination on personnel, equipment, material, and/or working areas to the lowest levels possible to permit the total removal of individual protective equipment and maintain military and civilian operations.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT: ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM

Outside the Continental United States Summary. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) planned for the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There was a concern that the military campaigns would increase the likelihood of an attack on US or allied interests in the region by terrorists employing WMD. In addition, Iraq presented a WMD threat to the region with its history of employing chemical weapons against its own population, a known theater ballistic missile capability, and suspected links to terrorists. In order to develop the capability to provide timely assistance to nations in the region in the event of a WMD attack, the Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), directed the establishment of a combined joint task force to focus on consequence management (CM). CM includes actions taken to mitigate the effects of WMD. This operational example provides a brief

history of Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management (CJTF-CM). Central to the example are the contributions of coalition partners who provided the preponderance of CJTF-CM response capabilities.

Narrative. As the lead component for CM within USCENTCOM, US Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) was tasked to organize and deploy a CJTF-CM headquarters (HQ) to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). US and coalition forces deployed to Kuwait to provide a rapid in-theater response capability, while other forces were assigned on prepare-to-deploy orders. CJTF-CM ultimately grew to over 1,500 personnel. From December 2001 through May 2003, CJTF-CM provided a regional CM response capability during periods of heightened risk of WMD attack associated with offensive military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

a. CM

(1) The range of CM functions includes: agent detection, marking and modeling of downwind hazards, hot-zone extraction, urban search and rescue, decontamination, medical triage, emergency medical treatment, transportation, engineering, providing life sustaining support to displaced persons, and managing information.

(2) Foreign CM is envisioned by the US as a United States Government (USG) response to a host nation (HN) request for assistance following a WMD event. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency for foreign CM and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG response. This response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to those provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). The ability of the USG to assist an HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the WMD event, the forces available to provide assistance and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The overriding goals of foreign CM are to save lives, reduce suffering, and support HN restoration of essential services.

b. CJTF-CM Mission

(1) CJTF-CM was new among the many US and coalition forces participating in OEF and OIF. The focus of the CJTF-CM was to save lives and reduce the suffering of victims of a potential WMD attack. The CJTF-CM mission statement specifically outlines its specific mission focus:

“When directed, CJTF-CM conducts CM operations in support of DOS to reinforce HN response capabilities at a CBRN or high-yield explosive incident site and support HN follow-on operations in order to save lives and reduce suffering.”

(2) The commitment of forward-deployed forces to CJTF-CM demonstrated the resolve of the US and its coalition partners to support

countries in the region; especially those within range of Iraq's theater ballistic missiles.

c. CJTF-CM Organization

(1) CJTF-CM was formed as a USCENTCOM joint task force under the operational control of Commander, MARCENT. This arrangement centralized responsibility for the mission with a single commander, ensuring unity of command and effort.

(2) The concept for the rapid establishment of CJTF-CM included an HQ provided by the US Marine Corps and response forces provided by US and coalition military units. Initially, US response forces that deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR were mostly limited to technical functions such as WMD detection and modeling. Several US and coalition capabilities were readied on a prepare-to-deploy status.

(3) At its peak, CJTF-CM had 1,565 personnel assigned in Kuwait, including 1,196 coalition and 369 US. The HQ staff numbered approximately 200. Approximately 3,000 additional US forces were assigned in a prepare-to-deploy status.

d. CJTF-CM Accomplishments

(1) Deployed and integrated the first CJTF-CM demonstrating the common US and coalition commitment to the Global War on Terrorism.

(2) Provided a forward-deployed capability to rapidly respond to a WMD event in the USCENTCOM AOR.

(3) Provided additional WMD defense capability to support military forces and high-value targets during the force build-up in Kuwait.

(4) Deployed a forward command element to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior's Civil Defense Emergency Operations Center to improve coordination between Kuwaiti first-responders and CJTF-CM.

(5) Reduced response times to the population centers of Kuwait City by positioning a response task force which helped allay Kuwaiti fears of the effects of potential Iraqi chemical attacks.

(6) Conducted twice-daily WMD monitoring patrols in coordination with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior and responded to two SCUD missile impacts in Kuwait.

(7) Provided other humanitarian services such as deploying a Czech field hospital and delivering large quantities of potable water to local inhabitants.

(8) Maintained liaison with the US Embassy in Kuwait and DOS Consequence Management Support Team.

(9) Surveyed industrial facilities in Kuwait to determine potential downwind hazards from toxic industrial chemicals or materials in the event of a release due to sabotage or attack.

(10) Supported improvements in Kuwaiti response capabilities through CJTF-CM and Cooperative Defensive Initiative (CDI) exercises with the Kuwait Ministries of Interior and Defense. CDI is a DOD/USCENTCOM program to enhance the ability of nations in the Gulf region to manage the consequences of a chemical or biological attack.

This model provided CJTF-CM with liaison officers, WMD reconnaissance, sampling, hot zone extraction, decontamination, field laboratory, transportation, and water distribution capabilities for independent operations in several locations. The capabilities of the task force, combined with CM exercises, served both a deterrent and readiness role by integrating all of the coalition capabilities into a cohesive team.

Conclusion. The CJTF-CM provided the ability to rapidly respond to possible WMD incidents to save lives and reduce suffering. On 8 May 2003, the CJTF-CM mission officially ended. The Global War on Terrorism will continue. Should a CM mission be required in the future, it is highly probable that coalition partners will lend their expertise and assistance. Combatant commands may use the CJTF-CM model as a template for future CM operations.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Domestic and Outside the Continental United States Permanent Installations Summary. Although there have been no large-scale weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management (CM) responses, hazardous materials teams respond daily to incidents around the world.

Narrative. The most recent example of domestic CM is the response to the anthrax letters mailed through the US Postal Service in September 2001. Although there had been extensive biological warfare CM planning prior to the event, the complexity of the delivery system, combined with the regional dispersion and jurisdictional issues led to numerous challenges. The overall CM response should be considered a success. There were in excess of 7000 people potentially exposed. A comprehensive medical

surveillance program combined with a solid public information campaign limited the number of casualties to five deaths and thirteen hospitalizations. Because of the integrated response plan of fire and law enforcement, some key evidence was recovered to support the ongoing investigation of the anthrax attacks. Some highlights of the CM response are:

- a. Rapid assessment and identification of the agent.
- b. Potential hazard areas identified.
- c. Preventive health measures started immediately.
- d. Active public affairs plan to inform, quell rumors, and allay fears.
- e. Deliberate and thorough decontamination procedures using the latest technology.
- f. Focal point for reporting analysis results from the laboratory.
- g. No one organization could do it all. A combination of local, state, federal, and military was required.

Military support included sampling, packaging, planning guidance, security, agent analysis, and a reach-back capability to scientists for technical advice.

Conclusion. The overall success of the response to a WMD attack is directly proportional to the prior planning. If the response is properly planned, rehearsed, and executed, the actions will serve as a deterrent to future attacks.

SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES

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CHAPTER V TRAINING AND EXERCISES

“For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action.”

Thucydides
History of the Peloponnesian Wars, c. 404 BC

1. Essential Elements of Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Training

a. Training, exercises, and formal education are vital to ensure that military forces can conduct operations to combat WMD. **Training to combat WMD is necessary to ensure that all personnel understand the threat, principles, agent characteristics, and required tasks.**

b. For the most part, training events and exercises to combat WMD will not require unique or stand-alone training events. **Most of the skills and equipment supporting tasks to combat WMD can be integrated into existing training events.** The key exception may be the specific aspects in the tasks to support offensive operations (interdiction, search and seizure, etc.).

c. Scenarios to combat WMD provide the opportunity for training in joint, multinational, and/or interagency processes. The skills required to effectively combat WMD cover all staff functions and reinforce those skills required for warfighting.

d. Combatant commanders should use all aspects of security cooperation activities including security assistance; multinational training, exercises, education, experimentation; defense and military contacts; foreign humanitarian assistance; and threat reduction measures in their AORs.

e. Joint, multinational, and Service component training exercises serve as a visible reminder of the US military’s capability, and can serve as a continual deterrent to WMD acquisition and use.

2. Nonproliferation Events

a. **Security Cooperation.** Securing international resources and facilities for training events to combat WMD will require a deliberate diplomatic effort. Existing maritime interdiction operations provide a solid basis on which to build for sea-based events. Air and ground based events will require a far more complex array of support and participation parameters. The aggressive nature of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) may require that existing HN support/participation agreements be retooled to meet the intent and time-sensitive nature of the PSI objectives.

b. **Military-to-Military Contacts.** Combatant command theater security cooperation plans should include opportunities for regional states to participate in and/or expand their interdiction capabilities.

c. **Conduct Surveillance and Tracking of Suspected WMD Threats.** The skills required to remain proficient in this mission are directly applicable to other warfighting tasks and forces staff integration

while not requiring a large number of forces or scenario development.

3. Counterproliferation Events

a. **Offensive Operations.** Offensive operations involve measures to eliminate the WMD threat, deter the use and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD, while being prepared to defend against the use and effects of WMD. The PSI brings a broader scope and wider range of options for offensive operations than previous programs and policies. **Most notably, the PSI adds air and ground interdiction options to the long-standing maritime interdiction capability.** The scope of the PSI will all but mandate that conventional forces participate in interdiction operations alongside national assets. Establishing baseline TTP and identifying equipment requirements for conventional units may require interdiction-specific training events. Validation of required interdiction capabilities will require a joint and multinational capstone event to ensure interoperability with existing capabilities. Integrating interdiction sustainment training into existing training and exercise schedules will allow for a broader integration of allied and/or coalition forces.

b. **Passive Defense and Force Protection.** The nature of PSI interdiction tasks may require organizations to employ CBRN defense equipment in non-standard previously undefined scenarios. Individual protective measures and the TTP that support them will remain constant. Employment of CBRN defense kits during search, seizure, or inspection operations may require adjustments to TTP.

c. **WMD Elimination Operations.** Mission-specific doctrine, and manpower/equipment requirements need to be developed and exercised. Services and combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that forces are properly trained to conduct this mission.

4. Consequence Management Events

a. **Response.** One of the key lessons learned from the initial national-level first-responder exercise [TOPOFF 2000] was the need for synchronization of response assets. Local and state emergency management officials were inundated with scores of volunteers with a wide range of skills. The challenge lay in getting the right skills to the right place at the right time. Securing the event site, triaging and treating casualties, preserving and collecting evidence, and eventually mitigating the hazard were key tasks to be tested in these venues, but the overwhelming influx of response personnel and equipment made it difficult — impossible in some cases — to accomplish these critical tasks. The scenario will be the same with an outside the continental United States event with the additional challenges of the potential language barrier and different chains of command. One solution was to establish a response personnel and equipment “assembly area.” In the event of a WMD attack, all first responders knew to report to the local/state command post at this predetermined site. From there, local and state authorities dispatched response assets as required. This ensured that critical roadways and facilities were kept clear for the movement of response assets and the evacuation of casualties. The assembly area also provided a secure environment for responders to fine tune training before the exercise began. Local and state authorities used this opportunity to survey the skills, equipment, and response capabilities before they were employed, and to establish accountability of response assets.

b. **Mitigation.** The process of reducing the immediate hazard will begin in the earliest stages of a WMD event. One critical consideration that must be addressed in training is the interoperability between law enforcement personnel and those who will perform mitigation tasks. The objective in this case is to prevent mitigation and evidence collection tasks from becoming mutually exclusive.

c. **Restorative Operations.** The long-term fight to eliminate the hazard from a WMD attack will require a long list of technical, highly specialized skills. Training will begin with baseline Occupational Safety and Health Administration hazardous materials certification, to include confined space and sample collection/packaging operations. EOD skills may be required if the event site has residual explosive components from the WMD device, or if the site is known or suspected of harboring UXO. Establishing C2 over and interoperability among the capabilities of these organizations and those of military organizations is paramount.

5. Training and Leader Development

a. **Commanders are the primary trainers for operations to combat WMD.** Commanders at all echelons are responsible to prepare their commands to accomplish assigned missions. Combating WMD requires different types of training depending on duty positions. Commanders should accomplish joint training in accordance with approved doctrine. Joint doctrine establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and provides guidance to employ national military power to achieve strategic ends. Combating WMD operations will be integrated throughout applicable joint doctrine publications to ensure that combating WMD operations and training are an integral part of joint training and not isolated events.

b. Formal combating WMD education with an emphasis on the WMD proliferation should be given at all levels of professional military education.

(1) Focus on mission accomplishment in an CBRN environment.

(2) Combatant commanders establish joint mission-essential tasks with quantifiable standards under CBRN conditions.

(3) Combatant commanders integrate combating WMD operations into joint training.

(4) All joint professional military education levels incorporate WMD into formal programs.

(5) Services incorporate combating WMD operations into training programs.

c. Development of a comprehensive combating WMD military training program and plan is an essential element of preparation for combating WMD. Such a program should include individual and collective training requirements for Categories 1-6 joint training with appropriate Universal Joint Task List tasks, conditions, and standards developed as training objectives for the three areas of NP, CP, and WMD CM. Joint combating WMD training is supported by the US Joint Forces Command Joint

Warfighting Center (JWFC), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the US Army Chemical School. Joint training courses in support of combating WMD training can be found in the database associated with JWFC's Joint Training Course Development and Management Process.

6. Conclusion

Combating WMD tasking, whether it is a CP interdiction or the response to an actual attack, will most likely occur with limited or no prior warning. Units must continually exercise to identify shortfalls in training and equipment because lack of preparation will not only be deadly but will also have strategic ramifications on future WMD proliferation and/or its use.

APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-40 is based on the following primary references:

1. General

- a. September 2002, *National Security Strategy*.
- b. December 2002, National Security Presidential Directive-17: *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
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- h. 17 December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: *National Preparedness*.
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GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|--|
| AFDD | Air Force doctrine document |
| AFH | Air Force handbook |
| AFI | Air Force instruction |
| AFMAN | Air Force manual |
| AFPD | Air Force policy directive |
| AOR | area of responsibility |
| | |
| C2 | command and control |
| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction |
| CP | counterproliferation |
| | |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| | |
| EOD | explosive ordnance disposal |
| | |
| FDO | flexible deterrent option |
| FM | field manual |
| | |
| HN | host nation |
| | |
| IO | information operations |
| | |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JWFC | Joint Warfighting Center |
| | |
| MCO | Marine Corps order |
| | |
| NDU | National Defense University |
| NP | nonproliferation |
| | |
| PSI | Proliferation Security Initiative |
| | |
| TRADOC | Training and Doctrine Command |
| TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| | |
| USG | United States Government |
| UXO | unexploded ordnance |
| | |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |
| WMD CM | weapons of mass destruction consequence management |

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

active defense. The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy. See also passive defense. (JP 1-02)

air defense artillery. Weapons and equipment for actively combating air targets from the ground. Also called ADA. (This term and its definition modify the exiting term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also coalition. (JP 1-02)

arms control. A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. (JP 1-02)

avoidance. Individual and/or unit measures taken to avoid or minimize nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks and reduce the effects of NBC hazards. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals, or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02)

chemical agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (JP 1-02)

chemical weapon. Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, that would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b), above. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance. (JP 1-02)

collective nuclear, biological, and chemical protection. Protection provided to a group of individuals in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment that permits relaxation of individual nuclear, biological, and chemical protection. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (This term and its definition modify the exiting term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

concept plan. An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation plan. (JP 1-02)

contaminate. See contamination. (JP 1-02)

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms,

the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

contamination control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless (temporarily or permanently) nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (JP 1-02)

counterforce. The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an enemy force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. (JP 1-02)

counterproliferation. Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02)

detection. 1. In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but unconfirmed by recognition. 2. In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance system that an event has occurred. 3. In arms control, the first step in the process of ascertaining the occurrence of a violation of an arms control agreement. 4. In nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments, the act of locating NBC hazards by use of NBC detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 1-02)

deterrence. The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02)

dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. 2. In anti-aircraft gunnery, the scattering of shots in range and deflection about the mean point of explosion. 3. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities that are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. 4. In chemical and biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. 5. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone. 6. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing of a ship in the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to minimize the risk of damage from attack. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application. (JP 1-02)

exercise. A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a multinational, joint, or single-Service exercise, depending on participating organizations. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

immediate decontamination. Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately upon becoming contaminated. It is performed in an effort to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit the spread of contamination. (JP 1-02)

individual protective equipment. In nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from biological and chemical hazards and some nuclear effects. (JP 1-02)

industrial chemicals. Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military chemical agents. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

interdict transfer of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. Operations to track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, related materials, technologies and expertise to/from state and/or non-state actors of proliferation concern. Operations will include redirection of international shipments of unauthorized WMD, related material, or WMD development information sources. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

international organization. An organization with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nations agencies. Also called IO. See also nongovernmental organizations. (This term and its definition modify the exiting term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

nonproliferation. Those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls) taken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. Also called NP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense. Defensive measures that enable friendly forces to survive, fight and win against enemy use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and agents. US forces apply NBC defensive measures before and during integrated warfare. In integrated warfare, opposing forces employ nonconventional weapons along with conventional weapons (NBC weapons are nonconventional). (JP 1-02)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operations should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (JP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows: a. permissive environment — Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment — Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational

area. c. hostile environment— Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant commander's strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant commander's strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)

passive defense. Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative. See also active defense. (JP 1-02)

precursor. Any chemical reactant that takes place at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system. (JP 1-02)

preemptive attack. An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. (JP 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02)

proliferation continuum. A complex but identifiable process involving generic activities which together constitute an adversary's proliferation process. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

proliferation (nuclear weapons). The process by which one nation after another comes into possession of, or into the right to determine the use of nuclear weapons, each potentially able to launch a nuclear attack upon another nation. (JP 1-02)

protection. 1. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. (JP 1-02)

readiness. The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: a. unit readiness — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. b. joint readiness — The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)

survey. The directed effort to determine the location and the nature of a chemical, biological, and radiological hazard in an area. (JP 1-02)

tactics. 1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities. (JP 1-02)

warning. 1. A communication and acknowledgment of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by potential opponents ranging from routine defense measures to substantial increases in readiness and force preparedness and to acts of terrorism or political, economic, or military provocation. 2. Operating procedures, practices, or conditions that may result in injury or death if not carefully observed or followed. (JP 1-02)


weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the

means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction consequence management. Those actions taken to respond to the consequences and effects of weapons of mass destruction use against our homeland, forces, and US interests abroad, and to assist friends and allies to restore essential services. Also called WMD CM. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

weapons of mass destruction elimination. Actions taken to control, transport to a safe location, or destroy on site, weapons of mass destruction and non-weaponized agents in a semi-permissive or permissive environment. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside of this publication.)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-40** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

